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vFOREWORD
Twenty-five years after al-Qaeda’s founding, 
countering al-Qaeda radicalization and recruitment 
remains a key U.S. Government (USG) strategic ob-
jective. Al-Qaeda proclaims itself the true Islamic 
vanguard seeking to overthrow alleged anti-Muslim 
apostate governments throughout the Arab Muslim 
world. Conducting spectacular, carefully orches-
trated anti-Western mass casualty terrorist attacks 
as a component of a broader pan-Sunni Islamist in-
surgent strategy, al-Qaeda deftly employs insidious 
propaganda. This propaganda creates Manichean 
alternatives—“The Crusader-Zionist War Against Is-
lam” versus “The Vanguard Defender of the Muslim 
Umma”—that have not been decisively discredited 
despite a barrenness in fact. An underground of self-
radicalizing individuals and small cliques incited by 
al-Qaeda agitation propaganda now also occupies the 
attention of the intelligence and criminal justice sec-
tors of virtually every Western nation. 
USG officials charged with counterterrorist mes-
saging have yet to effectively counter al-Qaeda’s infor-
mation warfare. The reasons for this, and a proposed 
methodology for rectifying it, are the core themes of 
Dr. Paul Kamolnick’s monograph. First, he argues that 
we have failed as a nation to realize fully that deeds 
are the most potent communication. Second, that 
many of our policies, actions, and deeds incite anger, 
moral indignation, outrage, and even hate in regions 
of the Arab and Muslim world most vulnerable to our 
nation’s least palatable foreign and military policies. 
This failure to view the world through Arab and Mus-
lim eyes, Kamolnick asserts, has enabled al-Qaeda’s 
sophisticated insurgent propaganda to successfully 
rationalize a violent strategy to assault what it alleges 
are those apostate pillars enabling Western hegemony 
in its Crusader War against a besieged and oppressed 
Muslim faith. Third, Kamolnick provides a highly 
critical review of several official reports and analyses 
proposing various remedial messaging strategies to 
“Sell America to a Westernized secular elite.” It is un-
likely, he argues, that U.S. credibility in the Arab and 
Muslim world can be enhanced through diplomatic 
spin, empty platitudes, vague pronouncements, or 
in his words, “putting lipstick on pigs.” This strategy 
he claims, whether disingenuous or simply unimagi-
native, has failed and will to continue do so. 
The USG’s substantial credibility deficit is the 
proximate cause enabling al-Qaeda’s information 
warfare advantage. Kamolnick’s counterintuitive 
conclusion, however, is that, while the USG does 
maintain certain questionable alliances, exhibit a pen-
chant for regime stability, and maintain a strategy of 
forward deployment in defense of vital energy cor-
ridors—succinctly summarized by him as “oil, Israel, 
and autocracy”—al-Qaeda can produce no evidence 
that the USG in deeds, policies, or actions is a religious 
Crusader bent on extirpating Islam. Indeed, authorita-
tive polling suggests substantial majorities in the Arab 
and Muslim world highly rank many core American 
values and distinguish between overall favorable at-
titudes toward America and Americans, and often 
vehement opposition to certain American foreign and 
military policies. Moreover, highly reputed militant 
Islamists are on record stating that U.S. strategic in-
terests do not preclude seeking and finding common 




Having made the case for taking USG deeds seri-
ously, Kamolnick shifts to proposing and outlining 
a methodology for leveraging the power of deeds 
against al-Qaeda. He first offers a conceptualization 
of adversary propaganda as a component of what he 
calls the insurgent “terrorist quadrangle” compris-
ing political objectives, terrorist propaganda, terrorist 
actions, and strategic objectives. He then provides a 
detailed outline of those core themes and messages 
which, if systematically organized in a coherent sus-
tained information counteroffensive, undermine al-
Qaeda’s case for employing terroristic violence. Key 
to this campaign is that al-Qaeda’s own deeds serve 
as the most damning evidence of its actual status as a 
criminal terrorist organization waging a self-declared 
offensive war to impose its will through terror on 
all—Muslim and non-Muslim—who disagree. Specifi-
cally, al-Qaeda’s perfidious methods, terroristic mo-
dus operandi, and responsibility for besmirching the 
Islamic Call, prove that it forsakes the shari’a of law-
ful jihad and is guilty of the commission of major sins 
in Islam; undermines Islamic and Muslim interests; 
and that its signature methods of coercion, force, and 
fear deny the rightful autonomy of persons—Muslim 
and non-Muslim—to exercise essential political and 
civil rights. 
Why a War of Deeds conceived in the manner 
Kamolnick suggests has not been operationalized in 
official USG strategy is puzzling. If he is right, it cer-
tainly does appear that al-Qaeda’s center of gravity as 
self-proclaimed vanguard and defender of a besieged 
Umma is vulnerable to frontal assault by the pow-
ers of reason, fact, and the evidence of deeds. This 
monograph provides much food for thought. Though 
provocative and in places possibly controversial, its 
argument deserves the serious attention of USG per-
sonnel tasked with conceptualizing and executing an 
effective information warfare strategy to counter this 
lethal adversary.
   
   DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
   Director
   Strategic Studies Institute and
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Disrupting, dismantling, and ultimately defeat-
ing al-Qaeda-based, affiliated, and inspired terrorism 
is the declared policy of the U.S. Government (USG). 
Despite noteworthy success in attacking the al-Qaeda 
(AQ) terrorist network and securing the homeland 
from terrorist attack, the United States has yet to ex-
ecute an effective methodology for countering radi-
calization and recruitment to AQ. This monograph 
proposes a distinct War of Deeds methodology for 
accomplishing this. 
A War of Deeds is to be fought on two interrelated 
fronts: changing deeds and challenging deeds. Chang-
ing deeds requires a frank examination and possible 
reorienting of those present-day USG foreign, military, 
and diplomatic policies that diminish USG credibility 
and potentially enhance the resonance of AQ’s terror-
ist propaganda in the Muslim world. It also requires a 
frank examination of existing USG information opera-
tions that in the opinion of the present writer fail to 
adequately address the present U.S. credibility deficit 
and whose proposals too often amount to unpersua-
sive marketing endeavors pitched to a highly selective 
Westernized audience. 
Challenging deeds involves systematically, com-
prehensively, and forcefully countering AQ’s terror-
ist propaganda, fabrications, and disinformation with 
verifiable facts. First, I undertake a careful analysis 
of the nature and function of propaganda in terror-
ist operations. I demonstrate the vital importance of 
AQ propaganda through the use of a proposed ana-
lytic construct—a “terrorist quadrangle”—linking po-
litical objectives, terrorist propaganda, terrorist acts, 
and strategic objectives; characterize the critical role 
and function of counterpropaganda in information 
warfare; and contrast counterpropaganda, as here 
defined, with current definitions of psychological 
operations (PSYOP) or military information support 
operations (MISO).
Next, I offer a comprehensive interpretation of 
influence operations, and a broadened conception of 
the nature of contemporary war and warfare. Here 
departing from the conventional seven instruments 
of national power captured by the Diplomatic, Infor-
mation, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence 
and Law Enforcement (DIMEFIL) or Military, Infor-
mation/Intelligence, Diplomatic, Legal, Infrastruc-
ture, Finance, and Economic (MIDLIFE) acronyms, 
I advance a new acronym, DICEFILM (Diplomatic, 
Informational, Cyber, Economic, Financial, Intelli-
gence, Legal, Military), which explicitly incorporates 
the cyber dimension of warfare, increasing to eight 
the instruments of national power. After providing 
this broadened conception of influence operations, 
contemporary warfare, and instruments of national 
power, I outline and illustrate the War of Deeds meth-
odology for countering AQ’s messengers, media, and 
message; and demonstrate how this methodology 
may be used to counter the two “great lies” authoriz-
ing AQ’s terrorist modus operandi, i.e., that the USG 
is an implacable foe and declared enemy of Islam and 
the greater Muslim world (“The Crusader”), and that 
al-Qaeda is fighting a purely defensive jihad on behalf 
of the oppressed worldwide Muslim faith community 
(“The Defender”). 
Following a brief conclusion, select strategic con-
siderations are examined with focus especially on the 
potential suitability, acceptability, and risks accompa-




FIGHTING THE WAR OF DEEDS
In the propaganda pioneered by al-Qaeda, terrorism is 
merely self-defense against a perceived American war 
on Islam. There has been no more stark statement of 
this belief than the courtroom declarations of Mr. Fais-
al Shahzad as he pleaded guilty and was sentenced 
to life without parole for the failed bombing in Times 
Square, New York. Calling himself a ‘Muslim soldier,’ 
Mr. Shahzad denounced the wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq and drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen. The 
drones, he said, ‘kill women, children, they kill every-
body. . . . It’s a war, and in war, they kill people,’ he 
added. ‘They’re killing all Muslims.’1
    Scott Shane
    April 2013
We will continue to make it clear that the United States 
is not—and never will be—at war with Islam. We 
will focus on al-Qaeda’s ability to project its message 
across a range of media, challenge the legitimacy and 
accuracy of the assertions and behavior it advances, 
and promote a greater understanding of U.S. policies 
and actions and an alternative to al-Qaeda’s vision. 
We also will seek to amplify positive and influential 
messages that undermine the legitimacy of al-Qaeda’s 
and its actions and contest its worldview. In some cas-
es, we may convey our ideas and messages through 
person-to-person engagement, other times through 
the power of social media, and in every case through 
the message of our deeds.2
   Barack H. Obama
   President of the United States
   June 2011
2The arrest or death of existing terrorists will be only 
a short-term success if al-Qaeda continues to recruit, 
indoctrinate, and train new members successfully. The 
U.S. Government must therefore determine how it can 
dissuade new recruits from joining al-Qaeda, as well 
as discourage individuals from providing the terrorist 
organization financial and other support.3
   Kim Cragin and Scott Gerwehr
   2005
INTRODUCTION
In a previous monograph, the author proposed a 
distinct “jihad realist” approach for countering radi-
calization and recruitment to al-Qaeda (AQ).4 It was 
argued that the military jihad is, and remains, a bind-
ing religious imperative for militant Islamists; a clas-
sical Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh al-jihad) regulates the 
waging of this military jihad; AQ’s anti-American 
mass casualty terrorism substantially violates this ju-
risprudence; and that this orthodox classical Sunnite 
fiqh al-jihad can, and should, be leveraged to delegiti-
mize AQ: especially among that sliver of recruits for 
whom upholding the shari’a is paramount, and the 
avoidance of major sins is a moral imperative. 
The present monograph proposes a “War of 
Deeds” to supplement the author’s jihad-realist ap-
proach. Its intended target audience comprises many 
different types of morally outraged potential recruits 
influenced by AQ’s terrorist propaganda that (self-) 
radicalize and (self-) recruit to “homegrown” and 
“home-based” terrorism or foreign theaters of conflict. 
This War of Deeds is to be fought on two interrelated 
fronts: changing deeds and challenging deeds. 
Changing deeds requires a frank examination and 
possible reorienting of those present-day U.S. Govern-
3ment (USG) foreign, military, and diplomatic policies 
that diminish USG credibility in the Muslim world, 
and also potentially enhance the resonance of AQ’s 
terrorist propaganda. 
Challenging deeds involves systematically, com-
prehensively, and forcefully countering AQ’s terror-
ist propaganda, fabrications, and disinformation with 
verifiable facts. 
A key premise of the present monograph is that, 
despite recognition that USG policies and actions are 
key drivers of attitudes and perceptions in the wider 
Muslim world, this recognition of deeds as commu-
nication has yet to inform sufficiently present ter-
rorist countermessaging strategy. To put it another 
way, if what we do matters far more than what we 
say, or what we say about what we do; if policies and 
actions speak far louder than words; if actions, not 
platitudes, signify definitive proof of one’s motives; 
then, this premise is neither fully acknowledged nor 
systematically exploited in USG information warfare 
designed to counter and delegitimize AQ’s terrorist 
propaganda. 
That the USG need not be beyond moral reproach 
or innocent of superpower capacities, interests, or 
behaviors, is a second, albeit counterintuitive, prem-
ise, anchoring the present argument. Ironically, this 
makes a systematic War of Deeds a more productive 
and candid endeavor. How so? USG veracity, cred-
ibility, and not moral perfection of motives or deeds 
is key. The USG’s dirtiest laundry discloses at worst 
that it engages in superpower realpolitik, privileges 
specific alliances, and defends what it perceives to be 
its vital strategic interests in an imperfect world using 
imperfect means. Evidence does not support a case 
however, even remotely, that the USG is leading or 
4fomenting a Crusader alliance against Islam. Yes, one 
can discover evidence for genuine tractable clashes of 
interests, intra-civilizational fault lines over religion 
and state, and even inter-civilizational dialogue and 
conflict; however, again, there is no credible evidence 
of a Crusader War against Islam or any systematic 
animus directed against Islam or Muslims in general. 
I have said nothing of the USG’s cleaner laundry, and 
there is much of it. I have said nothing of AQ’s dirtiest 
laundry, and there is much of that, described in ap-
propriate context as the argument unfolds. A detailed 
outline of the argument follows. 
First, data is reviewed confirming AQ’s continu-
ing resilience, and also noting progress, or lack there-
of, toward accomplishing declared USG policy and 
its three key strategic objectives outlined in the 9/11 
Commission Report (2004). Second, it is asserted that 
USG policies, deeds, and actions are communication, 
that they affect message resonance in the Arab and 
Muslim world, and the two key fronts in a proposed 
War of Deeds are identified: changing deeds, and 
challenging deeds. 
Third, a detailed examination of the first front, 
changing deeds, is provided. I first examine select ef-
forts in USG public diplomacy and their relative fail-
ure to put “lipstick on pigs.” I assess the unique chal-
lenges and opportunities arising from current USG 
foreign and military policies. Then I assert the vital 
importance of AQ tactical propaganda in relation to 
this author’s proposed analytic construct—a “terror-
ist quadrangle”— linking political objectives, terror-
ist propaganda, terrorist acts, and strategic objectives; 
characterize the critical role and function of counter-
propaganda in information warfare. Finally, I contrast 
counterpropaganda as here defined, with current defi-
nitions of psychological operations (PSYOP).
5In the remainder of the monograph, I outline, 
describe, and defend key elements comprising the 
second front: challenging deeds in a USG counter-
propaganda counteroffensive against AQ. I begin by 
proposing a comprehensive interpretation of influence 
operations, and a broadened conception of the nature 
of contemporary war and warfare. Second, departing 
from the conventional seven instruments of national 
power captured by the Diplomatic, Information, 
Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence and Law 
Enforcement (DIMEFIL) or Military, Information/In-
telligence, Diplomatic, Legal, Infrastructure, Finance, 
and Economic (MIDLIFE) acronyms, I advance a new 
acronym, DICEFILM (Diplomatic, Informational, 
Cyber, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, Legal, Mili-
tary) which explicitly incorporates the cyber dimen-
sion of warfare, increasing to eight the instruments of 
national power. 
Third, after providing this broadened conception 
of influence operations, contemporary warfare, and 
instruments of national power, I assert the primacy of 
a War of Deeds for challenging AQ’s terrorist propa-
ganda. I outline and illustrate the War of Deeds meth-
odology for countering AQ’s messengers, media, and 
message. I demonstrate how this methodology may 
be used to counter the two “great lies” authorizing 
AQ’s terrorist modus operandi, i.e., that the USG is an 
implacable foe and declared enemy of Islam and the 
greater Muslim world (“The Crusader”); and that AQ 
is fighting a purely defensive jihad on behalf of the 
oppressed worldwide Muslim faith community (“The 
Defender”). In conclusion, I summarize the main 
themes of the previous argument and offer concrete 
suggestions for strategists tasked with countering 
radicalization and recruitment to AQ. 
6AL QAEDA: AN EVOLVING THREAT, POLICY, 
AND STRATEGY
Despite declared USG policy to disrupt, dismantle, 
and ultimately defeat AQ,5 AQ and its affiliates, allies, 
and those motivated and inspired by its vision, con-
tinue to pose a significant threat to American citizens 
and U.S. national security. A decade of sanguine dec-
larations and commentary predicting AQ’s decline, 
demise, or even strategic defeat6 have been repeat-
edly upstaged by this resilient and highly adaptive 
enemy, and more “bearish” assessments have proven 
more reliable.7 AQ’s persistence as a lethal global 
threat—despite the May 2, 2011, killing of Osama bin 
Laden 8—and the August 2013 USG closure of nearly 
two dozen U.S. embassy compounds and worldwide 
travel alert,9 furnish additional evidence for this bear-
ish view. In addition, AQ, either directly or more 
generally through tactical allies, affiliates, or terrorist 
acts carried out in its name is associated with a lethal 
swath of global terrorist incidents. In 2011, 11 of the 
top 20 most active terrorist groups were linked to AQ. 
Together, those groups carried out over 780 attacks, 
resulting in 3,000 deaths and more than 4,600 wound-
ed. Further, four of the five most lethal attacks were 
linked to an AQ-linked group (AQ in the Arabian Pen-
insula [AQAP], Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, al-Shabaab, 
and AQ in Iraq).10 In 2012, six of the top 10 terrorist 
perpetrator groups worldwide had at least limited as-
sociation with AQ’s global insurgent terrorist modus 
operandi, conducting 1,470 terrorist attacks, which re-
sulted in 4,938 deaths.11
Recent reports documenting how AQ’s encrypted 
cyber communication facilitates transnational terror-
ist logistics and organization further evidences the 
7adaptive capacities of this lethal adversary.12 Finally, 
USG recognition of the evolving AQ threat ensures 
that strategists will be tasked with developing effec-
tive methods for countering this resilient foe. 13
THREE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES 
The seminal 9/11 Commission Report (2004) identi-
fies three key strategic objectives for a comprehensive 
counter-AQ strategy: (1) attacking terrorists and their 
organizations; (2) preventing the continued growth of 
Islamist terrorism; and, (3) protecting against and pre-
paring for terrorist attacks.14 Progress on two of these 
three strategic objectives, attacking terrorists and their 
organizations and protecting against and preparing 
for terrorist attacks, has certainly contributed to pre-
venting successful mass-casualty terrorist attacks on 
the scale of September 11, 2001 (9/11). 
Attacking Terrorists and Their Organizations. 
Defeating the AQ terrorist entity necessitates sys-
tematically attacking, degrading, and ultimately de-
stroying its means of sustaining itself as an ongoing 
organizational enterprise. Military, diplomatic, finan-
cial, legal, and intelligence instruments of national 
power have been deployed to great effect to accom-
plish the following: identify and prioritize sanctuary 
denial, actual or potential, in free states, failing states, 
and remote regions; attack terrorists and their orga-
nizations via identification, disruption, capture, and 
kill; attack elements required for complex internation-
al terrorist operation, including time, space, the ability 
to plan, and presence of a functional command struc-
ture; constrain the opportunity and space to recruit, 
8train, and select operatives; attack and deny logistics 
networks; deny access to weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) elements; disrupt reliable communication; 
and, eliminate the ability and opportunity for pre-
testing planning.15 
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Direc-
tor Matthew Olsen directly references these elements 
when, in congressional testimony, he delineated ac-
complishments against AQ during the period under 
review (August 2011-2012): 
[W]e have made significant progress in the fight 
against terrorism. Our nation has placed relentless 
pressure on al-Qa’ida’s leadership. We have denied 
the group safe havens, resources, and the ability to 
plan and train. Following the death last year of Usama 
bin Ladin, several of his top lieutenants have been 
eliminated. The leaders that remain lack experience 
and are under siege. They have limited ability to re-
cruit and communicate with other operatives. In short, 
the intelligence picture shows that al-Qa’ida core is a 
shadow of its former self, and the overall threat from 
al-Qa’ida in Pakistan is diminished. Further, the gov-
ernment has disrupted terrorist attacks in the United 
States and abroad. Our intelligence officers have 
worked diligently to identify and stop terrorist plots 
before they are executed. And we have investigated 
and prosecuting [sic] individuals who have sought to 
carry out and supported [sic] terrorist operations.16 
James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence 
(DNI), also references this strategic objective when he 
states in reference to “core AQ”: “Senior personnel 
losses in 2012, amplifying losses and setbacks since 
2008, have degraded core AQ to a point that the group 
is probably unable to carry out complex, large-scale 
attacks in the West.” He continues, however, 
9The group has essentially the same strategic goals 
since its initial declaration of war against the United 
States in 1996, and to the extent that the group en-
dures, its leaders will not abandon the aspiration to 
attack inside the United States.17 
Finally, in his May 23, 2013, National Defense 
University (NDU) speech, “The Future of our Fight 
Against Terrorism,” outlining and defending his pro-
posed counter-terrorist policy and strategy states spe-
cifically in relation to targeting terrorists, President 
Barack Obama stated: 
After I took office, we stepped up the war against al 
Qaeda, but also sought to change its course. We re-
lentlessly targeted al Qaeda’s leadership. Today, 
Osama bin Laden is dead, and so are most of his top 
lieutenants. There have been no large-scale attacks on 
the United States, and our homeland is more secure. 
Today, the core of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Paki-
stan is on a path to defeat. Their remaining operatives 
spend more time thinking about their own safety than 
plotting against us. They did not direct the attacks in 
Benghazi or Boston. They have not carried out a suc-
cessful attack on our homeland since 9/11.18
The USG Policy of Targeted Killing of High Val-
ue Targets (HVTs) Using Armed Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAVs, or “Drones”). Apprehending, arrest-
ing, and incarcerating AQ terrorists has been pur-
sued,19 and Special Forces raids carried out to find, 
fix, and finish specific targets, including on May 2, 
2011, AQ emir Osama bin Laden. Undoubtedly, the 
targeted killing of HVTs using UAVs or “drones” has 
been the dominant tactic of choice to disrupt, disman-
10
tle, and defeat AQ. After describing the Abbottabad, 
Pakistan raid leading to the killing of Osama bin Lad-
en, President Obama forthrightly stated his rationale 
for a policy of targeted killing:
It is . . . not possible for America to simply deploy a 
team of Special Forces to capture every terrorist. And 
even when such an approach may be possible, there 
are places where it would pose profound risks to our 
troops and local civilians– where a terrorist compound 
cannot be breached without triggering a firefight with 
surrounding tribal communities that pose no threat 
to us, or when putting U.S. boots on the ground may 
trigger a major international crisis. . . . To put it an-
other way, our operation in Pakistan against Osama 
bin Laden cannot be the norm. The risks in that case 
were immense; the likelihood of capture, although 
our preference, was remote given the certainty of re-
sistance; the fact that we did not find ourselves con-
fronted with civilian casualties, or embroiled in an 
extended firefight, was a testament to the meticulous 
planning and professionalism of our Special Forces—
but also depended on some luck. . . . And even then, 
the cost to our relationship with Pakistan—and the 
backlash among the Pakistani public over encroach-
ment on their territory—was so severe that we are 
just now beginning to rebuild this important partner- 
ship. . . . It is in this context that the United States has 
taken lethal, targeted action against al Qaeda and its 
associated forces, including with remotely piloted air-
craft commonly referred to as drones.20 
Evidence in support of the suitability/efficacy of 
drones for finding, fixing, and finishing terrorist HVTs 
is compelling,21 as is their lawfulness as a tool of war.22 
This likely explains recent trends in the expansion of 
drone bases whether used primarily for surveillance, 
lethal targeting, or both,23 as well as more recent of-
ficial pronouncements.24 
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The following evidence corroborates this asser-
tion. The drone campaign largely focused on the 
North and South Waziristan regions in Pakistan has 
devastated key AQ-based leadership and operatives, 
and key anti-USG forces attacking USG and Coalition 
International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF). Be-
tween 2004 and November 29, 2013, 353 strikes had 
been conducted, with 342 taking place since January 
2008, with the number of casualties as follows:  in 2006 
(122), 2007 (73), 2008 (286), 2009 (463), 2010 (801), 2011 
(405), 2012 (300), and 2013 (119 as of November 29, 
2013). Of those 353 strikes, 72 percent have hit targets 
in North Waziristan, and 24 percent have hit targets in 
South Waziristan. The number of Taliban/AQ lead-
ers killed in the territories of various Taliban factions 
from 2004-13 include the territory of Abu Kasha al 
Iraqi (12), The Haqqani Network (14), Mullah Nazir 
(9), Mehsud (7), Hafiz Gul Bahadar (6), Faqir Moham-
med (2), and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (1).25 The New 
America Foundation records the following totals for 
the 2004 to November 21, 2013, time frame: total drone 
strikes at 369; total numbers killed at 2,077-3,424, and 
the total number of militants killed at 1,620-2,783.26 
More telling, however, is the data for HVTs re-
moved from the field of battle. The total numbers in-
clude 1 in 2004, 2 in 2005, 2 in 2006, 0 in 2007, 19 in 
2008, 18 in 2009, 20 in 2010, 9 in 2011, 13 in 2012, and 
19 as of November 23, 2013.27 Consider the following 
select examples: 
• Senior-level clerics and ideologues: Abu Yahya 
al Libi,28  Kahlid bin Abdul Rahman al Husain-
an, Mansur al Shami;
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• Trainers: Abu Saif al Jaziri, Abdullah Hamas 
al Filistini, Abu Musa al Masri, Abu Rashid, 
Muhammaed Ilyas Kuwaiti, Muhammad Sajid 
Yamani;
• Commanders: Abu Laith al Libi, Khalid Habib, 
Abdullah Said al Libi, Hazrat Omar, Khan Mo-
hammed, Sheikh Yasin al Kuwaiti;
• Financiers: Mustafa Abu Yazid and Abu Zaid 
al Iraqi; 
• Bomb makers and explosives experts, including 
WMD: Abu Hamza and Abu Khabab al Masri; 
• Faciliators: Abdullah Azzam al Saudi; 
• Intelligence chiefs: Abu Ubaydah Abdullah al 
Adam; 
• External operations senior operatives or chiefs 
to West and other regions: Abu Sulayman Jazai-
ri, Abu Jihad al Masri, Osama al Kini, Saleh al 
Somali, Sadam Hussein al Hussami, Osama bin 
Ali bin Abdullah bin Damjan al Dawasari, Abu 
Hafs al Shahri, Aslam Awan; 
• Suicide operations chiefs: Wali Mohammed; 
• High-level leaders: Hakimullah Mehsud, Bait-
ullah Mehsud, Tahir Yuldashev, Sheikh Fateh 
al Masri, Jan Baz Zadran, Mullah Sangeen 
Zadran, Abd al Rahman al Yemeni, Abu Miq-
dad al Masri, Badr Mansoor, Abu Usamn Adil, 
Abu Yahya al Libi, Mullah Nazir, Attah Ullah 
Rafy Khan, and Waliur Rehman.29
Of extreme value has been the removal of AQ’s 
operatives who have previously become global 
managers: 
• Abu Faraj al Libi, from 2001 until capture in 
Pakistan in May 2005; 
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• Mustafa Abu al Yazid, (aka: Sheikh Saeed), 
2005 until death by drone strike in May 2010; 
• Atiyah Abd al Rahman, 2010 until death by 
drone strike August 22, 2011; and 
• Abu Yahya al Libi, 2011 until death by drone 
strike June 2012.30 
Seven key AQ leaders were killed by drone strikes in 
Pakistan subsequent to the May 2, 2011, Special Forces 
operation that led to the killing of AQ emir Osama 
bin Laden: 
• Abu Yahya al-Libi; 
• Ilyas Kashmiri (head of AQ’s military and 
member of external operations council);
• Atiyah abd al Rahman (bin Laden’s former 
chief of staff and Zawahiri’s previous deputy); 
• Abu Miqdad al Masri (a member of AQ’s Shura 
Majlis also involved in external operations);
• Badr Mansoor (AQ leader in Pakistan and 
key link to the Taliban and Pakistani jihadist 
groups);  
• Aslam Awan (deputy to the leader of AQ exter-
nal operations); and, 
• Abu Hafs al Shahri (senior AQ leader and op-
erations chief for Pakistan).
The role of drones in attacking AQ’s lethal affili-
ate, the Yemeni-based AQAP, is similarly telling. The 
number of U.S. airstrikes in Yemen climbed from un-
der five per year from 2002-10 to 10 in 2011, 42 in 2012, 
and 24 as of December 9, 2013. The number of AQAP 
casualties was 81 in 2011, 193 in 2012, and 97 as of 
December 9, 2013.31 
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The USG-targeted killing of American-born Yeme-
ni Anwar al-Awlaki, senior AQAP leader, propagan-
dist, and religious figure, in a drone strike in Yemen on 
September 30, 2011, is one of the more notable strategic 
successes of the ongoing drone campaign in Yemen. 
Killed in Marib in the Province of Jawf, Awlaki was 
considered, “Al Qaeda’s greatest English-language 
propagandist and one of its top operational plan-
ners.”32 Awlaki’s deadly reach is especially evident in 
the plots he helped plan and persons he inspired to 
attack in the United States. According to Peter Bergen:
24 ‘homegrown’ violent jihadist extremists in the 
United States who have been indicted or convicted of 
terrorism or have been killed while engaged in violent 
jihad since 2001 read Awlaki’s propaganda or main-
tained contact with him.33 
Some of the most notorious of those inspired by 
Awlaki to perpetrate or attempt to perpetrate the 
mass-killing of Americans, include: 
•     Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan, MD, age 39, 
Army psychiatrist, recently convicted and sen-
tenced to death on April 15, 2013, for the No-
vember 5, 2009, shooting and murder at Fort 
Hood, TX, of 13 soldiers, and wounding 31.
•  Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, age 25, who pled 
guilty to eight charges, including attempted 
murder and terrorism, for the December 25, 
2009, failed “underwear” bombing aimed at 
downing Northwest Airlines Flight 253 carry-
ing 279 passengers and 11 crew members as it 
approached Detroit, MI.34
•  Zachary Adam Chesser (aka Abu Talha al-
Amerikee) age 25, sentenced February 24, 2011, 
to serve 25 years in federal prison for three 
felony charges: providing material support to 
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terrorists, communicating threats, and solicit-
ing others to commit violence.35
•  Najibullah Zazi, for the September 2009 at-
tempted suicide attack in New York’s subway 
system.
•  Pakistani-American Faisal Shahzad, age 35, for 
the failed May 1, 2010, vehicle-born improvised 
explosive device (VIED) deployed in Times 
Square, New York, now serving a mandatory 
life sentence for his guilty plea on 10 felony 
counts.
•  Carlos Leon Bledsoe (aka, Abdulhakim Mu-
hammad), for the June 1, 2009, drive-by shoot-
ing and killing of a soldier outside a Little Rock, 
AR, military recruiting station, now serving a 
life sentence.36
•  Dhokhar (age 19), and Tamerlan Tsarnaev (age 
26), for having denotated two pressure cooker 
bombs during the Boston marathon, killing 
four (two females, aged 29 and 23; an 8-year old 
boy; and an MIT police officer, Sean A. Collier, 
killed three days after the bombing), and injur-
ing 264 others, many seriously and requiring 
amputation, including the serious wounding of 
a Transit Police officer.
The present drone policy has disrupted a Mumbai-
style mass casualty terror attack directed at Britain, 
France, and Germany37 as well as efforts to acquire 
and operationalize WMD.38 It has also disrupted the 
best of the terrorist bomb makers39 and those senior 
operational leaders enganged in transmitting terror 
craft to other affiliates.40 Finally, this drone policy has 
also disrupted long sought after chief facilitators, cou-
riers, and operatives such as Mustafa Hajji Muham-
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mad Khan (aka: Hassan Ghul).41 It also likely presumes 
that the security of confinement and imprisonment 
in many nations is unpredictable,42 and that, while 
highly desirable and necessary, existing “Rewards for 
Justice”43 bounties placed on HVTs cannot supplant a 
surer way to find, fix, and finish declared enemies. 
Many crucial HVTs are still at large and are cer-
tainly of intense interest to USG counterterrorism (CT) 
operators. For example: 
• Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri,44 present AQ emir and 
life-long violent Islamist;  
• Nasir Abdul Karim al-Wuhayshi, current emir 
of AQAP and now general manager and sec-
ond in command in AQ;
• Khalid al-Habib, responsible for AQ operations 
in Afghanistan and northern Pakistan; 
• Adnan el Shukrijumah and Saif al-Adel high-
level AQ senior leaders;
• Mustafa Hamid, father-in-law of Saif al-Adel; 
• Shaikh Said al-Sharif;
• Abu Mohammad al-Masri; 
• Anas al-Libi; 
• Matiur Rehman, a Pakistani militant and AQ 
planning chief; 
• Abu Khalil al-Madani, senior AQ operative; 
and, 
• Adam Gadahn, senior AQ communications 
and media official.
Also of intense value is Abdelmalek Droukdel (aka: 
Abu Musab Abdelwadoud), leader of al-Qaeda in the 
Islamic Magreb (AQIM), whose violent pedigree runs 
deep, his having joined the Algerian Islamic Group 
(GIA) in 1995, a splinter group, becoming a member of 
the GIA splinter group the Salafi Group for Preaching 
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and Combat (GSPC) in 1998—whose formal subordi-
nation to AQ was announced in 2003—to becoming 
the emir of the GSPC in mid-2004, and after 2006 join-
ing forces with AQ and in January 2007, changing its 
name to AQIM. Others include:
• Sirajuddin Haqqani, head of the Haqqani 
network;45 and,
• Ibrahim Sulaiman al Rubaish, AQAP’s 
mufti and a former Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, 
detainee.46
Protection Against and Preparation for  
Terrorist Attacks.
Protecting and preparing the U.S. homeland 
against terrorist attacks is a second key objective of 
current strategy.47 The following chief elements were 
identified by the 9/11 Commission as essential to this 
objective: 
• prohibiting terrorist travel; 
• acquiring and deploying biometric screening 
systems; 
• enhancing border security and immigration 
law enforcement; 
• enhancing aviation and transportation security; 
creating a layered security system; 
• setting priorities for national preparedness; 
• ensuring that command, control, and commu-
nications are intact and operative following a 
terrorist attack; 
• enhancing private sector preparedness; and,
• ensuring that American’s civil liberties are 
protected.48 
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Several key agencies are tasked with contributing 
to the success of this strategic objective, especially the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and several 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Multiple 
official reports identify the above tasks as essential to 
homeland defense and protection from terrorist at-
tack.49 Accomplishments and the agencies involved 
are identified by NCTC Director Matthew Olsen: 
The government has disrupted terrorist attacks in the 
United States and abroad. Our intelligence officers 
have worked diligently to identify and stop terrorist 
plots before they are executed. And we have investi-
gated and prosecuted individuals who have sought to 
carry out and support terrorist operations. In addition, 
we have continued to build an enduring counterter-
rorism framework—including institutions like NCTC 
and DHS [Department of Homeland Security]—dedi-
cated to analyzing and sharing terrorism information 
across the government and to the mission of detecting 
and preventing terrorist attacks against our citizens 
and interests around the world. The credit for these 
successes belongs to the men and women in our mili-
tary, law enforcement and intelligence communities.50
President Obama, in his May 2013 NDU speech, 
identifies these same accomplishments while also stat-
ing that his approach will abide by differing “rule of 
law” standards than his White House predecessor, ”. . . 
we strengthened our defenses—hardening targets, 
tightening transportation security, and giving law en-
forcement new tools to prevent terror.”51 A generally 
laudatory report issued September 2011 finds that 10 
years after 9/11, of the 15 recommendations made by 
the 2004 9/11 Commission Report directed at protecting 





• international cooperation on border security
• transportation security
• improved aviation security
• safeguard privacy of information
• executive branch department to ensure civil 
liberties/security tradeoff legally enforced
• objective risk assessment determines allocation 
of homeland security assistance
• private sector preparedness




• better passenger explosive screening
• justification of executive privilege
• entitlement to civil liberties
• incident command system adoption
• radio spectrum sharing.52 
Data on terrorist incidents in the United States, 
intelligence disruption of terrorist plots, legal actions 
against terrorist plotters, and official response to the 
April 15, 2013, Boston marathon terror attack largely 
also corroborate the considerable successes in pursuit 
of this strategic objective.53 It is important to note, 
finally, these tasks essential to strategic objective #3 
are the primary responsibility of the Department of 
Justice, DHS, (created in 2002; combines 22 existing 
federal agencies, workforce of 230,000, and budget ex-
ceeding $50 billion), the NCTC, and the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).54 
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Preventing the Continued Growth of  
Islamist Terrorism. 
Compared with the previous two strategic objec-
tives above, preventing the continued growth of Is-
lamist terrorism has proven the most challenging.55 
Indeed, during the past 4 years, challenges on this 
front have emerged as a source of official reports, 
commentary, concern, and perplexity. A seemingly 
battered and bruised AQ, reeling from 5 years of 
ramped up drone attacks and 12 years of post-9/11 
USG CT policy and national vigilance, has somehow 
managed to solicit and elicit the participation of hun-
dreds, if not thousands, of persons radicalized by its 
propaganda and recruited to any number of terrorist 
plots. Debate at present among CT analysts and poli-
cymakers concerns not whether new recruits are mak-
ing themselves available for terrorist acts, but how to 
conceptualize this phenomenon, and what strategies 
are required to combat it. 
Official pronouncements of this emergent phe-
nomenon are legion. Let us first consider a few of the 
more prominent official USG accounts. The Bipartisan 
Commission charged with evaluating the implemen-
tation of the 2004 Commission’s recommendations 10 
years after 9/11 asserts: 
Although Osama bin Laden is dead, al Qaeda is not; it 
is a network, not a hierarchy. Over a period of years, 
al Qaeda has been very adaptive and resilient. . . . Al  
Qaeda’s capabilities to implement large-scale attacks 
are less formidable than they were ten years ago, but 
al Qaeda and its affiliates continue to have the intent 
and reach to kill dozens, or even hundreds, of Ameri-
cans in a single attack. Al Qaeda has been marked by 
rapid decentralization. The most significant threats 
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to American national security come from affiliates of 
core al Qaeda . . . [al-Awlaki and AQAP; South Asia]; 
. . . failing or failed states such as Yemen and Soma-
lia. . . . al Qaeda’s strategy of ‘diversification’—attacks 
mounted by a wide variety of perpetrators of different 
national and ethnic backgrounds that cannot easily be 
‘profiled’ as threats. . . . Most troubling, we have seen 
a pattern of increasing terrorist recruitment of Ameri-
can citizens and residents to act as ‘lone wolves’. To-
day, we know that Americans are playing increasingly 
prominent roles in al Qaeda’s movement. Muslim-
American youth are being recruited in Somali commu-
nities in Minneapolis and Portland, Oregon, in some 
respects moving the front lines to the interior of our  
country. . . . Alarmingly, we have discovered that indi-
viduals in the U.S. are engaging in ‘self-radicalization’. 
This process is often influenced by blogs and other 
online content advocating violent Islamist extremism. 
While there are methods to monitor some of this activ-
ity, it is simply impossible to know the inner thinking 
of every at-risk person. Thus, self-radicalization poses 
a serious emerging threat in the U.S.56 
A similar characterization of this emergent phe-
nomenon is described in the 2011 National Strategy for 
Counterterrorism (NSCT). For example: 
[I]n recent years the source of the threat to the United 
States and its allies has shifted in part toward the pe-
riphery—to groups affiliated with but separate from 
the core group in Pakistan and Afghanistan. This also 
includes deliberate efforts by al-Qa’ida to inspire indi-
viduals within the United States to conduct attacks on 
their own.57 
The broadened definition of an “adherent” in this 
NSCT also evidences this shift: adherent is defined as 
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[i]ndividuals who have formed collaborative relation-
ships with, act on behalf of, or are otherwise inspired 
to take action in furtherance of the goals of al-Qa’ida—
the organization and the ideology—including by en-
gaging in violence regardless of whether such vio-
lence is targeted at the United States, its citizens, or its  
interests.58 
A litany of similar warnings is sounded at 
various places. 
Although its brutal tactics and mass murder of Mus-
lims have undermined its appeal, al-Qa’ida has had 
some success in rallying individuals and other mili-
tant groups to its cause. Where its ideology does reso-
nate, the United States faces an evolving threat from 
groups and individuals that accept al-Qa’ida’s agenda 
whether through formal alliance, loose affiliation, or 
mere inspiration. . . . Adherence to al-Qa’ida’s ideol-
ogy may not require allegiance to al-Qa’ida, the orga-
nization. Individuals who sympathize with or actively 
support al-Qa’ida may be inspired to violence and can 
pose an ongoing threat, even if they have little or no 
formal contact with al-Qa’ida. Global communications 
and connectivity place al-Qa’ida’s calls for violence 
and instructions for carrying it out within easy reach 
of millions. Precisely because its leadership is under 
such pressure in Afghanistan and Pakistan, al-Qa’ida 
has increasingly sought to inspire others to commit 
attacks in its name. Those who in the past have at-
tempted attacks in the United States have come from 
a wide range of backgrounds and origins, including 
U.S. citizens and individuals with varying degrees of 
overseas connections and affinities.59
[We] must retain a focus on addressing the near-term 
challenge of preventing those individuals already on 
the brink from embracing al-Qa’ida ideology and re-
sorting to violence.60
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. . . [P]lots directed and planned from overseas are not 
the only sort of terrorist threat we face. Individuals in-
spired by but not directly connected to al-Qa’ida have 
engaged in terrorism in the U.S. Homeland. Others are 
likely to follow their example, and so we must remain 
vigilant.61
Europe also faces a threat from individuals radicalized 
by al-Qa’ida ideology to carry out violence despite 
their lack of formal affiliation with or operational di-
rection from al-Qa’ida or its affiliates.62
The 21st century venue for sharing information and 
ideas is global, and al-Qa’ida, its affiliates and its 
adherents attempt to leverage the worldwide reach 
of media and communications systems to their ad-
vantage. . . . In the global information environment, 
al-Qa’ida adherents who promote or attempt to com-
mit violence domestically are influenced by al-Qa’ida 
ideology and messaging that originates overseas, and 
those who attempt terror overseas often cite domestic 
U.S. events or policies. At the same time, people—in-
cluding those targeted by al-Qa’ida propaganda—live 
in a local context and are affected by local issues, me-
dia, and concerns.”63
It is clear that al-Qa’ida the organization has been 
degraded and out of weakness, called on individu-
als who know the group only through its ideology to 
carry out violence in its name. . . . And even as the 
core of al-Qa’ida in Pakistan and Afghanistan contin-
ues to be dismantled through systematic CT actions, 
we have expanded our focus in this Strategy to articu-
late the specific approaches we must take to counter 
al-Qa’ida affiliates and adherents on the periphery, be 
they established affiliated groups in Yemen or Somalia 
or individual adherents in the Homeland who may be 
mobilized to violence in al-Qa’ida’s name. . . . As some 
threats have been diminished, others have emerged, 
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and—correspondingly—as some of our approach re-
main constant, so have others evolved.64
NCTC Director Olsen, after having cited great 
progress along strategic objectives one and three,65 
similarly remarks:66
 
While these gains are real and enduring, al-Qa’ida, 
its affiliates and adherents around the world—as well 
as other terrorist organizations—continue to pose 
a significant threat to our country. This threat is re-
silient, adaptive, and persistent. More than a decade 
after the September 11th attacks, we remain at war 
with al-Qa’ida, and we face an evolving threat from 
its affiliates and adherents. . . . Indeed, the threats we 
face have become more diverse. As al-Qa’ida core 
leadership struggles to remain relevant, the group has 
turned to its affiliates and adherents to carry out at-
tacks and to advance its ideology. The group remains 
committed to striking Western targets, including the 
United States . . . compel[ling] operational planners 
to place a greater emphasis on smaller, simpler plots 
that are easier to carry out . . . Since Bin Laden’s death, 
multiple al-Qa’ida leaders have publicly endorsed the 
concept of individual acts of violence . . . .
Homegrown violent extremists (HVEs), including 
those inspired by al-Qa’ida’s ideology, continue to 
pose a threat to the United States. HVEs inspired by al-
Qa’ida are almost certainly entering a period of transi-
tion as US-based violent extremists adjust to the deaths 
and disruption of influential English-language figures 
who helped al-Qa’ida’s ideas resonate with some in 
the U.S. Now deceased AQAP members Anwar al-
Aulaqi and Samir Khan were probably best positioned 
to create propaganda specifically for an American au-
dience and mobilize HVEs. Their propaganda remains 
easily accessible online and will likely continue to 
inspire HVE violence. The growth of online English-
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language extremist content during the last three years 
[2009-2012] has fostered a shared identity—but not 
necessarily operational collaboration—among HVEs. 
Plots disrupted during the past year were unrelated 
operationally, but may demonstrate a common cause 
rallying independent violent extremists to plot against 
the US. Lone actors or insular groups pose the most 
serious HVE threat to the homeland. HVEs could view 
lone offender attacks as a model for future plots in the 
United States and overseas. The perceived success 
of previous lone offender attacks combined with al-
Qa’ida and AQAP’s propaganda promoting individu-
al acts of terrorism is raising the profile of this tactic”67 
In recent Congressional testimony, DNI Clapper 
proposes a nearly identical assessment when he as-
serts that “[t]errorist threats are in a transition period 
as the global jihadist movement becomes increasingly 
decentralized” and comprises the following actors 
of deepest concern to the USG.68 Core AQ will con-
tinue its targeting of the United States as noted above, 
but one now must consider the following delineat-
ing and disaggregation of the contemporary threat 
landscape. AQAP’s continued attempt to hit the U.S. 
homeland but also adjust its own techniques, tactics, 
and procedures in relation to more local objectives; 
AQ-inspired HVEs which he estimates “will con-
tinue to be involved in fewer than 10 domestic plots 
per year” and will be motivated to engage in violent 
action by global jihadist propaganda, including Eng-
lish-language material, such as AQAP’s Inspire maga-
zine; events in the United States or abroad perceived 
to be threatening to Muslims; the perceived success 
of other HVE plots, such as the November 2009 at-
tack at Fort Hood, TX, and March 2012 attacks by an 
AQ-inspired extremist in Toulouse, France; and their 
own grievances.
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In a discussion of the “global jihadist threat over-
seas” including “affiliates, allies, and sympathizers,” 
Clapper states that despite AQ’s complete absence in 
fomenting the “Arab Spring,” it presents “opportu-
nities for established affiliates, aspiring groups, and 
like-minded individuals to conduct attacks against 
US interests”; that the Arab Spring will also increase 
the likelihood of diminished state capacities that 
will facilitate: 
weakened or diminished counterterrorism capabili-
ties, border control mechanisms, internal security pri-
orities, and other shortcomings in these countries—
[that] combined with anti-US grievances or triggering 
events—will sustain the threats to US interests 
throughout the region.69 
The President’s 2013 NDU speech makes repeated 
reference to the evolving threat environment now 
confronting U.S. CT policy and strategy. Referencing 
“core AQ” and “regional affiliates” in Africa, Yemen, 
Somalia, and Iraq in terms identical to NCTC Director 
Olsen and DNI Clapper, Obama explicitly identifies 
the rise of home-based and home-grown radicaliza-
tion and recruitment to terror70: 
Finally, we  face a real threat from radicalized individ-
uals here in the United States. Whether it’s a shooter at 
a Sikh Temple in Wisconsin; a plane flying into a build-
ing in Texas; or the extremists who killed 168 people at 
the Federal Building in Oklahoma City—America has 
confronted many forms of violent extremism in our 
time. Deranged or alienated individuals—often U.S. 
citizens or legal residents—can do enormous damage, 
particularly when inspired by larger notions of violent 
jihad. That pull towards extremism appears to have 
led to the shooting at Fort Hood, and the bombing of 
the Boston Marathon. . . .71
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A recent report72 to the United Nations (UN) Se-
curity Council by a team responsible for reporting on 
the implementation and success of sanctions pursuant 
to Resolution 2083 (2012) concerning AQ, associated 
individuals, and entities similarly finds: 
•  that the AQ threat continues to diversify, with 
the evolution of a range of loosely linked af-
filiates and the rise of autonomously radical-
ized individuals and cells drawing on AQ’s 
ideology. While the threat posed by AQ as a 
global terrorist organization has declined, the 
threat posed by its affiliates and infectious 
ideas persists.73
•  Three developments point to the continuing 
evolution of the threat. First, terrorist propa-
ganda on the Internet continues to grow in 
sophistication and reach, and is contributing 
to the problem of self-radicalization. Second, 
the recent attacks in Boston, London, and Paris 
point to the persistent challenge of acts of ex-
pressive terrorist violence committed by in-
dividuals or small groups. Troublingly, these 
may draw on autonomous attack plans rather 
than the specific leadership tasking of either 
AQ or affiliates.74 Third, the continuing civil 
war in the Syrian Arab Republic has seen the 
emergence of a strong AQ in Iraq . . . attracting 
hundreds of recruits from outside the Syrian 
Arab Republic.75
•  AQ and its affiliates have shown themselves 
to be adept communicators, using marketing 
and propaganda to cultivate supporters and 
incite attacks.76
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Finally, academic analysts Schweitzer and Men-
delbaum make several keen observations on AQ’s re-
cent prospects, despite being damaged over the past 
decade by a global anti-terrorist regime. “[T]he lead-
ers of al-Qaeda and its affiliates,” they assert, “chose 
to adopt the Arab Spring in order to turn it into an 
Islamic Spring.” By exploiting toppled regimes, form-
ing opportunistic tactical alliances, wreaking chaos, 
fomenting ungovernability, taking advantage of secu-
rity lapses, and streaming in foreign fighters, it may be 
the case that: 
al-Zawahiri’s vision of establishing a caliphate and re-
storing Islam’s lost glory seems imaginary, [however], 
it is likely that al-Qaeda, by means of its affiliates and 
perhaps also on its own, will try to renew its efforts 
to carry out a grand terrorist campaign, as it did in 
the past, following the withdrawal of the United States 
and NATO from Afghanistan.77 
Daily headlines and the increased probabilities as-
sociated with terrorist action arising in a less central-
ized fashion and involving persons more recently re-
cruited to a so-called jihadist path typify larger swaths 
of contemporary life. It is one thing to be treated to 
high level reports, analyses, policies, pronounce-
ments, and findings, and another to assemble the 
raw data centering on individual persons whose acts 
or potential acts lead them to find the very publicity 
they seek. 
We earlier listed some of Awlaki’s most prominent 
terrorist recruits—Major Nidal Malik Hassan, Dzo-
har and Tamerlan Tsarnaev, Zachary Adam Chesser, 
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, Shahzad Faisal, and 
Carlos Leon Bledsoe. Let us now consider the briefest 
sampling of others whose names have graced head-
lines in recent years: 
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•  Bangladeshi Quazi Mohammed Rezwanul Ah-
san Nafis, 21, arrested in a sting operation in-
volving a fake 1,000-pound VIED bomb.78
•  Jose Pimentel, a 27 year-old Muslim convert 
of Hispanic origin; a follower of Awlaki, con-
structed the bombs based on Inspire’s “Make a 
Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom.”79
•  Naser Abdo, 21, a professed conscientious ob-
jector based on his Muslim beliefs: 
found in a motel room three miles from Fort 
Hood’s main gate with a handgun, an article 
titled “Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your 
Mom” from AQAP’s English-language Inspire 
magazine and the ingredients for an explosive 
device, including gunpowder, shrapnel, and 
pressure cookers. . . . Abdo told investigators 
he planned to construct two bombs in his motel 
room using gunpowder and shrapnel packed 
into pressure cookers and then detonate 
the explosives at a restaurant frequented by  
soldiers. . . . On his way out of the courtroom he 
yelled “Iraq 2006!” and the name of Abeer Qas-
sim al-Janabi, a 14-year-old Iraqi girl who was 
raped that year before she and her family were 
killed. Five current or former soldiers went to 
prison, one for a life term, for their roles in that 
attack. He also shouted the name of Hasan, 
an Army major and psychiatrist charged with  
killing 13 people at Fort Hood.80
•  Mohammed Mahmood Alessa, 20 (born in 
the United States and of Palestinian descent), 
and Carlos Eduardo Almonte, 26 (naturalized 
citizen born in Dominican Republic), arrested 
before boarding separate flights for Egypt and 
then to Somalia, June 5, 2010, for planning an 
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assassination to outdo Major Nidal Malik Has-
san. “He’s not better than me. I’ll do twice what 
he did,” Alessa allegedly said in undercover 
recordings by New York Police Department 
undercover officers.81
•  Rezwan Ferdaus, 27, studied physics at North-
eastern University in Boston, his family resi-
dent in Ashland, MA, an upscale suburb west 
of Boston, “admitted to planning to blow up 
the Pentagon and the United States Capitol us-
ing remote-controlled planes laden with explo-
sives”; sentenced to 17 years in prison.82
•  Adel Daoud, an 18-year-old suburban Chicago 
man arrested for attempting to detonate what 
he thought was a car bomb outside a Chicago 
bar. . . . [He] had been under surveillance for 
months, and in multiple conversations with 
agents expressed a desire to kill on a mass scale 
as revenge for what he believed was the perse-
cution of Muslims by the United States.83
•  Walli Mujahidh, 34, was one of two men who 
planned to storm the Military Entrance Pro-
cessing Station south of downtown Seattle with 
machine guns and grenades in retaliation for 
U.S. military actions in Afghanistan. Enlistees 
are screened and processed at the station. The 
other conspirator Abu Khalid Abdul-Latif, also 
known as Joseph Anthony Davis, was sen-
tenced to 18 years in prison last month. The 
pair, both U.S. citizens, were arrested in June 
2011 and pleaded guilty of the attempted mur-
der of officers and agents of the United States 
and conspiracy to use weapons of mass de-
struction. Grenades are treated as weapons of 
mass destruction under U.S. federal law.84
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•  Gufran Ahmed Kauser Mohammed, a 30-year-
old naturalized U.S. citizen born in India, and 
Mohamed Hussein Said, a 25-year-old Kenyan, 
were “accused of having used Western Union 
to wire a total of $96,000 to an al Qaeda affiliate, 
al-Nusra Front . . . and al Shabaab” in Somalia. 
The money was to help Said in getting fighters 
out of Africa and into Syria. The men have also 
been accused of recruiting or trying to recruit 
individuals overseas to join rebels linked to 
al-Qaeda.85
Residents of various European countries also awaken 
to similar headlines. Consider for example:
•  Seven suspects between 22 and 32 years of age, 
all described as British residents, arrested in an 
anti-terror operation.86
•  Three Muslim immigrants to Norway were ar-
rested for a terrorist plot; a Uighur from China, 
an Iraqi Kurd, and an Uzbek, had ties to op-
eratives of AQ in the tribal areas of Pakistan, 
all members of the Turkistan Islamic Party, a 
Uighur separatist group based largely in the 
lawless Pakistani tribal area of Waziristan.87
•  Three men, born in Britain of Pakistani origin, 
were found guilty of the 2006 conspiracy to at-
tack seven transatlantic airliners bound for the 
United States and Canada with liquid bombs. 
In all, 10 men faced charges in the case that in-
volved three separate criminal trials; all but two 
were convicted. . . . Scotland Yard, describing its 
effort as the most elaborate terrorism investiga-
tion it has ever mounted, said the costs of the 
police operations alone amounted to nearly $40 
million. The case involved the deployment of 29 
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separate surveillance teams during the months 
the plotters were under observation and was 
said to have been the most costly investigation 
in the force’s history. . . . The bombs the plot-
ters prepared for the attacks, consisting of liq-
uid explosive inserted by syringes into plastic 
soft-drink bottles, led to tight new restrictions 
on the liquids and creams passengers can take 
onto flights. . . . Prosecutors at the trials said the 
plot, if successful, would have caused deaths 
on a scale comparable to the 9/11 attacks, and 
most of the potential toll of 1,500 to 2,000 vic-
tims were likely to have been Americans. . .88
•  Taimor Abdulwahab al-Abdaly, 28, a disaffect-
ed Iraqi Swede, detonated two bombs, killing 
only himself. A Swedish citizen, he had been 
living in Britain for the past 10 years.89
•  Raed Jaser, 35, born in the United Arab Emir-
ates (UAE) to Palestinian parents but not a 
UAE citizen, was living in Toronto at the time 
of his arrest, and Tunisian-born, Chiheb Es-
seghaier, 30, both arrested in plot to derail a Via 
passenger train running between New York 
City and Montreal. Charged with conspiring 
to carry out an attack and murder people in 
association with a terrorist group, they could 
face life in prison if convicted. . . .  A few weeks 
after Esseghaier and Jaser were arrested, FBI 
officials arrested a Tunisian man in New York 
who they said was linked to the Via rail terror 
plot. Ahmed Abassi was charged with trying to 
stay in the United States illegally to build a cell 
for international acts of terror. Prosecutors said 
Abassi had radicalized Esseghaier. The indict-
ment charges Abassi with two counts of lying 
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on applications for a green card and work visa. 
Each count carries a maximum term of 25 years 
in prison upon conviction.90
•  Zahid Iqba, Mohammaed Sharfaraz Ahmed, 
Umar Arshad, and Syed Farhan Hussain, be-
tween 22 and 31 years of age, were jailed in 
Britain on Thursday for discussing terrorist 
attacks, including plans to blow up an army 
reserve center using a bomb-laden toy car. 
They downloaded files containing instruc- 
tions for the attack, bought survival equipment 
and collected money for terrorist purposes. 
The men were recorded discussing sending a 
remote-controlled toy car carrying a home-
made bomb under the gates of an army reserv-
ist center and speaking of using instructions in 
an AQ manual to make an improvised explo-
sive device. Iqbal and Ahmed were jailed for 16 
years and 3 months, while Arshad received a 
sentence of 6 years and 9 months. Hussain was 
jailed for 5 years and 3 months.91
•  Irfan Naseer, Irfan Khalid, and Ashik Ali 
planned to detonate up to eight rucksack bombs 
in a suicide attack or set off timber bombs in 
crowded areas. . . . Prosecutor Altman said the 
plot was “on a scale potentially greater” than 
the July 7, 2005, bombings that killed 52 peo-
ple on London’s underground train and bus 
networks and that “the defendants were in-
spired to commit terrorism by the anti-Western 
sermons of U.S.-born radical cleric Anwar al- 
Awlaki.”92
•  Michael Adebolajo, 28, born in Britain to a 
Christian family that moved to Britain from Ni-
geria, who converted to Islam at approximately 
age 16, after the 9/11 attacks, and Michael Ade-
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bowale, 22 born in Nigeria and immigrated to 
Britain as a child, brutally murdered Lee Rig-
by, aged 25, an infantryman in the Royal Fu-
siliers, and drummer who performed ceremo-
nial guard duties at Buckingham Palace, while 
Rigby was walking near a military barracks in 
south London. He was first rammed by a car 
and then hacked to death by these two knife-
wielding—meat cleaver and kitchen-knife— 
assailants, one of the men shouted “Allahu Ak-
bar,” or “God is great,” as the attack proceeded. 
A man who appeared to be in his 20s or early 
30s held a cleaver in one of his bloodied hands. 
He offered what seemed to be a political mes-
sage before the police arrived. “I apologize that 
women had to see this today, but in our lands 
women have to see the same thing,“ he said. 
“You people will never be safe. Remove your 
governments! They don’t care about you.” He 
then referred to what appeared to be a mo-
tive for the attack, saying it was carried out, 
“Because of what’s going on in our own coun-
tries.” Britain has suffered more than any other 
country in Northern Europe from Islamic ter-
rorist plots in recent years, and it has worked 
assiduously to prevent more. Security offi-
cials have said that at any given time they are 
tracking hundreds of young men in extremist 
networks.93
The phenomenon of radicalization and recruitment 
to various emergent non-U.S. conflict zones before and 
after the Arab Spring is another noteworthy develop-
ment.94 Again, a nonrandom sample of various recent 
news accounts may be perused in support.95
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MESSAGE RESONANCE AND U.S. CREDIBILITY  
IN THE MUSLIM WORLD: USG DEEDS,  
ACTIONS, AND POLICIES AS  
COMMUNICATION 
A voluminous literature exists analyzing, evaluat-
ing, and proposing policies to counter (self-) radical-
ization and (self-) recruitment to AQ-based, affiliated, 
associated, or inspired terrorist attacks. A panoply of 
psychological and sociological variables is proposed 
as predictors of terrorist actions. These include: be-
ing male, aged 16-44, occupationally marginalized, 
religiously intolerant or a new religious convert, ex-
hibiting an unstable or crisis-prone social identity, 
personally maladaptive, and possessing a lack of psy-
chosocial resilience.96 However, as Sageman points 
out, though these states and traits are undoubtedly 
significant and at least partially descriptive of persons 
who engage in terrorist acts,97 tens or hundreds of mil-
lions of persons worldwide exhibit these same states 
and traits who do not engage in terrorist behaviors. 
More problematic for purely compensatory theories 
of terrorist behavior, the vast majority does not exhib-
it any abnormal psychological or psychosocial traits, 
and many lead relatively successful lives, both materi-
ally and relationally.
Moreover, psychologically normal affective bases 
underpinning terrorist motivation—anger, moral in-
dignation, moral outrage, or at its outermost limit, cat-
egorical hate—sufficiently explain why many terrorist 
recruits self-deploy as human bombs and killers. Re-
venge and retribution for perceived wrongs commit-
ted against Muslims is cited as justification, again and 
again, exceeding by a huge factor excuses or justifica-
tions made in the name of Islam or shari’a, let alone 
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the jurisprudence governing the fighting of jihad (fiqh 
al-jihad.98 Rather, it is because these persons perceive 
that the West generally and the United States in par-
ticular is at war with Islam—oppressing, aggressing, 
humiliating, murdering, and exploiting Muslims—
that terrorist acts are, in their minds, morally justified. 
Finally, this empathy and moral indignation are con-
siderably enabled by both a real or vicarious identifi-
cation as “fictive kin” of the worldwide Islamic umma 
or faith community, and an actual kinship among 
diasporic populations.99
If one excepts abnormal psychological traits among 
select lone-wolf terrorists, then countering radicaliza-
tion and recruitment to AQ terrorism requires that one 
abandon the hunt for the “terrorist mind” and take up 
the task of countering the (mis-) perception that the 
United States is an aggressive, oppressive, and exploit-
ative power truly at war with and inexorably hostile 
to Islam. This task entails engaging three key psycho-
logical variables—perception (cognition), affect (emo-
tions), and behavior (volition)—causally related in the 
following manner: Changing perception from one of 
oppression, to one of fairness and fair dealing ordinar-
ily diminishes one’s sense of moral indignation and 
outrage. This diminished moral outrage ordinarily 
eliminates the desire to seek retributive justice, and 
in extreme cases, violent revenge. Finally, the dissolu-
tion of a desire for violent revenge against one or one’s 
(real or fictive) kinsman’s perceived oppressors great-
ly reduces the likelihood one will be self-recruited to 
engage in terrorist acts.100 
If the United States is at war with Islam and Mus-
lims worldwide, it stands to reason that one must at-
tack and confront the American foe. It would not be 
an act of cowardice, but one of courage, to do so. It 
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would involve sacrificing possibly one’s life, estate, 
and friends and family; for some, exiting a life of rela-
tive security, privilege, and opportunity. But the de-
fense of the defenseless against a perceived predatory 
power requires that one leave this life behind, and that 
after this life, Allah’s favor will more than make up for 
the fears, tears, and disrupted lives that this sacrifi-
cial death entails. These affective variables—revenge, 
moral outrage, retribution, payback, defense of one’s 
religion, and defense of one’s people—I believe, must 
be fully understood and combated at the level they 
require.101
* * * * *
In the remainder of this monograph, a distinct 
method is proposed for countering the perception that 
the United States is at war with Islam, the moral out-
rage it inspires, and the terrorist response it too often 
enjoins. I shall call this method “a War of Deeds” or 
“counterpropaganda of the deed.” The latter phrase, 
analytically compelling and a time-honored military 
art, may nevertheless be tainted by the negative at-
tributes associated with the term “propaganda.” The 
former War of Deeds avoids the stigma of “propagan-
da” and offers the  twin benefit of contrast to a “war of 
ideas” approach, the problems of which will be iden-
tified at appropriate points. Further, by emphasizing 
deeds, actions, and USG policies, rather than words, 
intentions, and promises, we shift the primary battle-
ground to one of countering enemy propaganda with 
facts and evidence that I believe can, if deftly crafted 
in a systematic, sustained campaign, eviscerate AQ’s 
fabrications and lies. This proposed War of Deeds is of-
fered as a distinct, realistic, and credible approach for 
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neutralizing, combating, and ultimately obliterating 
the affective outrage propelling recruits to place their 
lives at the service of AQ’s terrorist modus operandi. 
It is to be fought on two fronts, “changing deeds” and 
“challenging deeds.” 
Changing deeds, the first front, enhances the reso-
nance of the USG message in the Arab and Muslim 
world through actively fostering policies that rein-
force, amplify, and increase the probable success of 
the second front—challenging AQ’s disinformation, 
fabrications, lies, and distortions. 
Changing deeds requires that the USG honestly 
examine the actual impact of U.S. foreign and military 
policy in the greater Muslim world. It is imperative 
that the USG make the case in deeds, actions, and 
official policies, not intentions or promises, that the 
United States is not at war with Islam or Muslims, and 
is indeed a formidable power whose interests, values, 
and ultimate objectives are not inimical to Islam and 
the Islamic faith, the Islamic Call and Muslim inter-
ests. It is not perfection, but the proven absence of 
enmity or active pursuit of policies, deeds, or actions 
designed to denude and destroy Islam, or predatory 
waging of war against a weak and defenseless umma, 
that must be proved. 
Challenging deeds, the second front, requires that 
the USG successfully refute AQ’s propaganda, disin-
formation, fabrications, and distortions regarding the 
practical consequences of U.S. deeds, policies, and ac-
tions, and of AQ’s own, in the Muslim world. 
These two interrelated tasks have a common objec-
tive: persuasively proving in deeds, actions, policies, 
and actual behaviors that the USG is not at war with 
Muslims and Islam. That this must be proven and 
not taken for granted; that this not be seen as an ex-
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ercise akin to combating holocaust denial or the 9/11 
“truthers” is essential. It is not essential that the Unit-
ed States be innocent of superpower motives, actions, 
intentions, or behaviors; nor that, there is no national 
dirty laundry, past or present, to discuss. What is es-
sential is that we prove that these actions do not sig-
nify any type of ongoing, systematic enmity directed 
at Islam, Muslims, or the Arab World in particular. 
We must prove this even though USG actions may on 
occasion signify other potentially unsavory interests 
and alliances, as well as many potentially and actually 
beneficent means and ends. In short, what must be 
proved, through the evidence of deeds and not inten-
tions, promises, or attempts at spin, is that the United 
States is not now and has never been at war with Islam 
and does not actively desire nor require its negation. 
Furthermore, the USG must prove it is innocent of all 
charges of intentionally targeting, harming, or foster-
ing aggression against or oppression of Muslims on 
account of faith or works. 
CHANGING DEEDS AND ENHANCING  
MESSAGE RESONANCE 
Changing deeds is key to enhancing message reso-
nance and is the necessary first front in a sustained 
campaign to counter radicalization and recruitment 
to AQ-inspired terrorism. This premise rests on three 
propositions. First, there is widespread recognition 
among officials charged with enhancing U.S. cred-
ibility, that deeds, actions, and policies are persuasive 
communication. As we will soon see, official attempts 
to obscure this simple fact through public diplomacy 
or strategic communication are doomed to fail. Sec-
ond, considerable literature comprised of official USG 
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policies and reports from government oversight bod-
ies, academics, and think tanks concludes that opposi-
tion to American foreign and military policies, and not 
to Americans or American values per se, are key driv-
ers of anti-American animus and the proximate cause 
for declining U.S. credibility and standing in the Arab 
and Muslim world. Third, despite anti-American ani-
mus motivated by opposition to U.S. foreign and mili-
tary policies, however, no objective evidence exists of 
any officially-sanctioned USG “Crusader” war being 
waged against Islam as a religious faith, or Muslim 
adherents to that faith. Let us examine these in turn.
The Limits of Public Diplomacy and Strategic  
Communication: Or, the “Lipstick on Pigs”  
Problem.102
The Information Operations Primer defines “Strate-
gic Communication” as “the orchestration of actions, 
words, and images to achieve cognitive effects in sup-
port of policy and military objectives.”103 Though all 
communicative elements are important, U.S. Army 
information operations specialists most especially 
view actions to be as effective and successful strate-
gic communication. Actions “speak for themselves” 
and signify the assurance of intentions and values far 
more than promises and platitudes. Though primar-
ily written with specific military operations in mind, 
the following assertion can easily be generalized to 
human actions: 
[S]enior officials point out that strategic communica-
tion is ’80% actions, and 20% words.’ Specifically, how 
military operations are conducted affects the informa-
tion environment by impacting perceptions, attitudes 
and beliefs . . . [and] . . . how military operations are 
41
conducted or policy is implemented is also a key com-
ponent of strategic communication, since actions send 
very loud and clear messages.104 
The primacy of actions is also evident in a criticism 
of the concept “strategic communications” by retired 
admiral Michael Mullen, former chairman of Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. In opposition to a “marketing model 
of countering Taliban propaganda being promoted 
by the Rendon Group,” Mullen reportedly refuses 
to even use the phrase strategic communication and 
insists simply on providing “information and context 
about military operations.” He declares: 
I really do not like the term at all. It confuses  
people. . . . It means all things to all people. It’s way 
overused and overrated. I literally try never to use the 
term. We communicate as much if not more by our actions. 
I have become particularly concerned at a time that 
resources are so precious. It has become a thing unto 
itself. It is taking resources from the fight. I don’t have 
time for it. (emphasis added).105
Actions are deemed key to the more general con-
cept of information operations as well. The purpose of 
information operations is: 
. . . to influence the behavior of target decision-makers 
while simultaneously defending friendly decision-
makers from being influenced by an adversary’s use 
of information. This is no different from the exercise 
of the other forms of national power. In this instance 
the means is information, but the resulting outcome is 
the same.106 
The key role of actions among forms of influence, 
however, is well noted: 
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[P]ersonal interactions are perhaps the most impor-
tant means a target audience can be influenced. In the 
context of persuasive influence, these interactions can 
range from compulsion and coercion on one end of 
the spectrum to cooperation and collaboration on the 
other. . . . Regardless of how a message is transmitted, 
the credibility of our messages and messengers is key 
to the effectiveness of our influence efforts. We must 
recognize that we lose credibility when the implied mes-
sages of our actions do not match the messages of our covert 
communications. If these messages are not coordinated 
during the IO planning process, our credibility and ef-
fectiveness suffer (emphasis added).107 
Other agencies also recognize the role of deeds in 
general, as well as the vital role of deeds in diagnosing 
and diminishing the present U.S. credibility gap in the 
Arab and Muslim world. However, unlike the matter-
of-fact role ascribed to actions above, this explicit rec-
ognition of the importance of deeds frequently gets 
dialed down and packaged in strategies far less bold 
than demanded. Minimizing the importance of deeds 
shows a failure of imagination or an unwillingness to 
fully consider the implications of one’s premises at 
best. At worst, charges of inconsistency, incoherence 
or even duplicity may be leveled. Some examples of 
this behavior and its results follow.
Let us first consider one of the earliest examples 
of this schizoid character. It actually calls for putting 
“lipstick on a pig” in order to make what are unde-
sirable policies appear something other than they 
are. Just over a month after 9/11, Richard Holbrooke, 
then-ambassador to the UN, issued one of the earli-
est alarms to policymakers and the public of our ap-
parently inexplicable failure to counter what then 
appeared to be the unstoppable juggernaut of Osama 
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bin Laden’s propaganda. Consider the following 
assertion:
 
Call it public diplomacy, or public affairs, or psycho-
logical warfare, or—if you really want to be blunt—
propaganda. But whatever it is called, defining what 
this war is really about in the minds of 1 billion Mus-
lims in the world will be of decisive and historic im-
portance. Yet every expert in Islam, every analyst of 
what is happening in the Muslim world, agrees that 
Osama bin Laden has gained the initial advantage in 
this struggle by arguing that this is a war against Is-
lam, rather than, as President Bush correctly says, a 
war against terrorism. At first glance, this seems in-
credible: How could a mass murderer who publicly 
praised the terrorists of Sept. 11 be winning the hearts 
and minds of anyone? How can a man in a cave out 
communicate the world’s leading communications  
society?108 
To what, then, does Holbrooke attribute this U.S. 
failure in public diplomacy and strategic communica-
tion? “Part of Bin Laden’s success lies in his shrewd 
mix of modern media technologies and medieval sym-
bols,” Holbrooke declares, “. . . [a]nother  factor is his 
exploitation of the seething resentment of Arabs to-
ward U.S. support for Israel.” Remarkably, Holbrooke 
then declares each of these elements as “largely out-
side our control.”109 
Bin Laden’s message is out of our control because 
he “controls his own message,” and as for the second, 
Holbrooke asserts, “we cannot reward terrorism by 
reducing our support for Israel.” But one might ask 
at this point, isn’t it crucial, at the very least, to forth-
rightly recognize that perceptions of the United States 
as backer and facilitator of a continuing occupation 
and humiliation of Palestinian aspirations underpin 
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anti-American animus, and not a hatred of America or 
Americans, let alone American values? In fact, could 
not the case be made here that it is precisely the un-
willingness to extend these cherished American val-
ues of liberty, self-determination, and social justice 
to the case of the Israel-Palestinian confrontation, or 
continuing support for repressive autocratic govern-
ments—one that profoundly undermines credibil-
ity throughout the Arab and Muslim world, as well 
as many other quarters—that is the elephant in the 
room? Or, to conclude that it is American hypocrisy, 
not American ideals and values that underpins the 
U.S. credibility problem and facilitates resonance of 
Osama bin Laden’s terrorist propaganda?110
Instead, Holbrooke offers an unconvincing or, at 
worst, an incoherent retort. His first move is to cast 
USG policy against AQ as an ideological war, a so-
called “battle of ideas,” rather than one based in poli-
cies, actions, and deeds. His second tack is to recog-
nize the importance of actions, but in terms that belie 
the logic of his own admission that a “seething resent-
ment” in the Arab Muslim world must be addressed. 
Let us consider each in turn. 
What should concern us most urgently are the appar-
ent failure of our own message and the inadequacy of 
our messengers. If we fail to convince Muslims that 
this is not a war against Islam but a war against ter-
rorism, if bin Laden succeeds in defining the struggle 
in his own terms, then he will have succeeded in his 
goal—even if, as I confidently believe will be the case, 
he is tracked down and ultimately eliminated. . . . The 
battle of ideas therefore is as important as any other aspect of 
the struggle we are now engaged in. It must be won. To fix 
this problem we must address both the message and 
the messengers (emphasis added).111 
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While important steps, such as “visiting the Is-
lamic Center in DC” and “meetings with leading 
Muslims and Arab Americans,” were immediately 
taken in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 (9/11), 
Holbrooke stated afterwards  that things have “gone 
downhill.” He believes the missed opportunities that 
could have prevented this about-face involve the fol-
lowing: failure to open a dialogue with “key Muslim 
intellectuals” over an errant and murderous misuse of 
the Qur’an, failure to publicize the fact that hundreds 
of Muslims were also murdered in the terrorist attack 
on the 9/11, the failure to prove to Muslim women 
that they would be sent back to a stone age should Bin 
Laden triumph, and finally, the failure “to find cred-
ible Arabic-speaking Muslims to speak the truth about 
bin Laden.” 
It is undoubtedly true that leveraging the juris-
prudence of lawful jihad, identifying the terrorist 
violations of that law, and specifying the major sins 
committed is an important tactic, one that the present 
writer advocates.112 However, it is insufficient since 
only a sliver of potential recruits is apprised of this 
jurisprudence, and likely bound to it. Also, what does 
Holbrooke mean by “the truth of Bin Laden”? Who 
are these “credible Arab-speaking Muslims” who 
shall speak such a “truth”? For Holbrooke, it is simply 
inexplicable why the United States could or should be 
losing this propaganda war: certainly there is some-
one who can say something that can undermine the 
legitimacy of this man who speaks from a cave! Miss-
ing here, is any discussion of actions, deeds, and USG 
policies examined from the point of view of those who 
may see themselves as potential victims and seek to 
become agents seeking retribution, even if the method 
of terror amounts to a morally reprehensible and mur-
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derous tactic. But Holbrooke believes, it seems, to even 
raise the question of policy is to “reward terrorism.” 
Holbrooke concludes his clarion call by identifying 
the “messengers” required to arrest the decline in, rec-
tify, and fortify U.S. credibility. Actually, the only dis-
cussion of messengers he offers had already occurred 
when Holbrooke invoked “credible Arab-speaking 
Muslims,” as possible ambassadors who will speak 
to the purity of America’s intentions and ideals. He 
deems these possible ambassadors as “key Muslim 
intellectuals,” or “leading Muslims and Arab Ameri-
cans.” Here, he actually discusses the media required, 
and more specifically, the agencies required, to mobi-
lize to confront the bin Laden virus. What he suggests 
is the need for a full-blown national propaganda effort 
along the lines of World War II and the Cold War. 
A similar special office is essential now. It must be run 
from the White House, the only place in Washington 
that can coordinate—by which I mean direct—public 
affairs activities of State, Defense, Justice, CIA, AID 
and others toward the Muslim world. More resources 
will be required; special broadcasting systems dedi-
cated to this cause must be created, not for Afghani-
stan, but for the entire Muslim world, including Mus-
lims in non-Arab countries such as India and China, 
and for that matter, Western Europe, where the terror 
networks are deeply embedded. . . . This must be a 
sustained effort separate from, but closely allied to, 
the war on terrorism. In fact, it will last longer than 
the war itself and would, if successful, have other 
benefits. . . . We cannot afford to lose; and if we do, a 
permanent struggle will lead to a permanent crisis—
just what bin Laden and his supporters want.113
Holbrooke’s opinion editorial, penned just 1 
month after the 9/11 attacks, presumes that a “battle 
of ideas” must be fought contrasting an un-Islamic, 
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murderous, diabolical bin Laden seeking the enslave-
ment of Muslim women and the resurrection of a me-
dieval caliphate, with America’s true values, virtues, 
and ideals. “If only they truly knew what we truly 
stand for!” he seems to declare. “If only we could tell 
the true story of our commitment to human rights, de-
mocracy, social justice, and liberty for all! How can a 
man in a cave out communicate the world’s leading 
communications society?” he asked.114 
Could he, with deep reflection, have answered that 
it is not about communicating with high-sounding 
words or wrapping oneself in glorious ideals. Instead, 
it is about what we do, not about what we say about 
what we do. It is about how deeds, policies, and ac-
tions communicate. It is about the experiences of those 
who live with the consequences of these policies. It is, 
in short, very much about the perception of virtually 
unconditional support for Israel’s continuing occupa-
tion; of the politics of oil reserves; and the autocrats 
and monarchs of the Gulf. It is about USG policy 
and moral outrage. It is about credibility, in fact and 
in deed, not about the failure of the world’s greatest 
superpower to discover the philosopher’s stone re-
vealing the secret message, messengers, and media, 
required to refute bin Laden. It is the “lipstick on pigs 
problem,” in other words. It is not about ideas, or a 
“battle of ideas”; it is about deeds, and a War of Deeds. 
Approximately 3 years after 9/11 and the inaugu-
ration of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), 1 year 
after the U.S. overthrow of Saddam Hussein and mili-
tary occupation of Iraq, and 4 years into the second 
Palestinian intifada, another promising yet highly 
compromised beginning is in evidence in an early 
official effort to diagnose what appeared to be an 
abject failure of U.S. public diplomacy and strategic 
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communication.115 A careful reading reveals a surpris-
ingly candid analysis of how U.S. policies contribute 
to this collapse in U.S. credibility.116 It is a prescient 
analysis of the rise and power of nonviolent politi-
cal Islamists, and yet, like Holbrooke, its response is 
paltry and targets a narrow band of cherry-picked 
pro-Western secular elites. This response never once 
considers revisiting U.S. policy priorities to see how 
they might affect those vast majorities whose opinions 
are registered in plummeting opinion polls.117 Let us 
briefly consider this scathing review of U.S. policies, 
clear recognition of an ascendant nonviolent political 
Islam, and impoverished suggested remedies. 
By late-2003, virtually every major opinion poll 
throughout the Arab and Muslim world was regis-
tering its lowest ever favorable ratings of the United 
States. Without question, U.S. credibility was in 
free fall.118 The predominant finding of this report is 
unequivocal:
Muslims do not ‘hate our freedom,’ but rather, they 
hate our policies. The overwhelming majority [in 
opinion polls] voice their objections to what they see 
as one-sided support in favor or Israel and against Pal-
estinian rights, and the long-standing, even increasing 
support for what Muslims collectively see as tyrannies, 
most notably in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Pakistan, 
and the Gulf states. . . . Thus the critical problem in 
American public diplomacy directed toward the Mus-
lim World is not one of ‘dissemination of informa-
tion,’ or even one of crafting and delivering the ‘right’  
message. Rather, it is a fundamental problem of  
credibility. . . .119
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In another remarkably frank admission, the study 
authors assert:
The United States finds itself in the strategically awk-
ward—and potentially dangerous—situation of being 
the longstanding prop and alliance partner of these 
authoritarian regimes. Without the U.S. these regimes 
would not survive. Thus the U.S. has strongly taken 
sides in a desperate struggle that is both broadly cast 
for all Muslims and country-specific. This is the larger 
strategic context, and it is acutely uncomfortable: U.S. 
policies and actions are increasingly seen by the over-
whelming majority of Muslims as a threat to the sur-
vival of Islam itself.120 
The report also betrays a very clear-headed analy-
sis of Islamism distinguishing violent revolutionary 
Islamism from nonviolent reformist Islamisms, each 
with a similar short-term strategic objective: 
If there is one overarching goal they [Islamists] share, 
it is the overthrow of what Islamists call the ‘apostate’ 
regimes: the tyrannies of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Paki-
stan, Jordan, and the Gulf states. They are the main 
target of the broader Islamist movement, as well as the 
actual fighter groups.121 
A prescient analysis is offered of the role that these 
reformists are likely to play and their closer proximity 
to the aspirations and approved methods for achiev-
ing them supported by an even larger majority.
[I]t is even more interesting to track the relative weight 
of the non-Jihadi Islamists, also called “moderate’ or 
“New Islamists,’ because their professed vision of Is-
lamic Restoration is non-violent, tolerant, and relative-
ly pluralistic. It can be argued that the New Islamists 
are in fact the true center of gravity in the Muslim 
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World today, in that they have the most authority to 
make change, and draw on the highest levels of sym-
pathy form less-active, but receptive and supportive 
Arab majorities. In this construct the Jihadis are seen 
as perhaps necessary to make change begin and thus 
become eventually inevitable, but the radicals do not 
appeal to the majority of Muslims in terms of practical 
change if and when the old regimes finally collapse.122 
One would expect such candid analysis of the U.S. 
strategic predicament in the Muslim world could and 
should lead to a broader debate over policies, priori-
ties, the consequences experienced by the vast masses 
and the Islamist currents circulating among those 
masses. Instead, we are treated to the following stra-
tegic recommendation. On the one hand, a “revolu-
tionary” strategy requiring the USG should massively 
inflate the resources dedicated to U.S. communication 
efforts, including huge expansion in budgets, posi-
tions, authority, and a centralized executive-level fo-
cus.123 On the other hand, we should exclusively target 
and selectively build-up U.S.-friendly agents. 
The U.S. Government should target those who sup-
port, or are likely to support, our views based on 
their own culture, traditions and attitudes about such 
things as personal control, choice and change. Private 
sector best practices define this as the ‘hard support’ 
and ‘soft support’ in a marketplace and they are not 
only the likeliest to move in the U.S. Government’s 
direction, but they’re also the likeliest to move others. 
Both their behavior and viral communications form 
the most powerful and credible medium for attitudi-
nal change. Specifically, for example, we believe the 
most ‘movable’ targets will be the so-called secular-
ists of the Muslim world: Business people, scientists, 
non-religious educators, politicians or public admin-
istrators, musicians, artists, poets, writers, journalists, 
actors and their audiences and admirers.124
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The report suggests “state of the art practices” de-
rived from advertising, marketing, and political cam-
paigns to accomplish these goals, while assiduously 
avoiding any further discussion of those policies it 
correctly ascertained were the most significant im-
pediments to U.S. credibility. Nothing is said regard-
ing the grave strategic predicament facing the United 
States as the final backer and guarantor of regimes 
deemed tyrannical, autocratic, and undemocratic, or 
as a state opposed to the legitimate aspirations of Pal-
estinians. Instead this report insists that a secular elite 
will assist us in lipstick sales, all along knowing and 
actually having described in this Report the pigs for 
which it is destined.
Several USG documents or high-level analyses 
throughout the decade exhibit similar failures to bold-
ly rethink U.S. policies and their relation to  U.S. cred-
ibility in the Arab and Muslim world. In the June 2007 
U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic 
Communication issued by the Under Secretary for Pub-
lic Diplomacy and Public Affairs,125 we learn of the 
importance of the diplomacy of deeds,126 the impor-
tance of counterpropaganda, the necessity of counter-
ing AQ disinformation and propaganda in cyberspace 
through further expanding the mission of the existing 
State Department Digital Outreach Team (DOT), and 
the necessity for a new Counterterrorist Communica-
tions Center.127 Yet, this diplomacy of deeds is reduced 
to displays of U.S. humanitarianism during times of 
disaster, famine, or poverty relief, which, in itself, is 
insufficient for quelling a deeper animus rooted in 
our chosen friends, strategic partners, and allies in 
the region. 
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Unlike the unvarnished 2004 Defense Science 
Board discussion of the deeper policy roots of the 
U.S. decline in credibility, this report obliterates this 
dimension entirely. Again, unlike the 2004 report, it 
presumes a “Good Muslim/Bad Muslim dichotomy” 
which entirely fails to understand the fissures that ex-
ist within Islam over AQ’s means and ends. Like the 
2004 report, however, it entirely neglects potential Is-
lamist and conservative allies and reduces the choices 
to either “mainstream” voices that espouse and em-
brace secular liberal democracy, or AQ presented as 
a caricatured death cult. AQ is presented without 
sufficient understanding of the broader phenomenon 
of Sunni militancy, and the potential of its reformist 
variants as a form of political Islam not necessarily 
inimical to U.S. core values and vital interests in the 
region.128 There is not a single mention of Israel-Pal-
estine, oil, or autocracy. Offering a compelling list of 
messaging themes, and correctly defending the neces-
sity of systematic counterpropaganda and leveraging 
AQ’s violations of the shari’a and commission of ma-
jor sins, one easily concludes that genuine grievances 
are likely to be assuaged by words, and symbolic hu-
manitarian gestures. 
A second Defense Science Task Force report on 
strategic communication issued in 2008 is a queer 
creature, combining elements of its 2004 incisiveness 
with what appears to be a continuing flight from its 
implications.129 A promising beginning is made when 
it states:
[W]e have changed our thinking in important ways. 
This report reflects our heightened appreciation that 
success in strategic communication depends on . . . 
deep comprehension of the identities, attitudes, cul-
tures, interests, and motives of others . . . awareness 
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by leaders and practitioners that what we do matters 
more than what we say. (p. x; emphasis in original).
So what shall our responses be to the documented 
rise throughout the decade of anti-Americanism?130 
The Report’s authors provide global survey data in-
dicating extremely negative attitudes toward the U.S. 
occupation of Iraq, increasing support among Muslim 
and Arab societies for use of suicide attacks in Iraq 
and especially in the Palestinian territories. One is 
then treated to the following underwhelming corre-
lations: between tsunami relief in Indonesia and im-
proved attitudes toward Americans, but not American 
policies; and, an even weaker correlation between U.S. 
earthquake relief in Pakistan, and Pakistani attitudes 
toward Americans or American policies. It is not just 
that the correlations are weak, but that perceptions 
of U.S. policies remain unchanged, despite gratitude 
and improved attitudes toward the American public. 
Symbolic and life-saving humanitarian gestures as 
communication is certainly welcome, and necessary. 
But the same persons who welcome such assistance 
do not, as a result, abandon deep and abiding attach-
ments and commitments to their sisters and brothers 
perceived to be suffering under varying forms of oc-
cupation, oppression, and tyranny. 
In a section entitled “Implications for Strategic 
Communication,” another promising beginning is 
made when the authors assert: “Disseminating infor-
mation and ‘getting the message right’ are not top pri-
orities. Trust, credibility, actions, legitimacy, and rep-
utations are critical to success.”131 Rather than identify 
concretely what policies and actions may lead to trust, 
credibility, actions, legitimacy, and reputations how-
ever, the report then strangely references the need for 
messaging and various types of messengers.
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Many federal, state, and local nongovernmental, cor-
porate, and individual enterprises originating in the 
United States are involved in strategic communication 
with foreign audiences. While there is no single en-
terprise performing the role of program leader, each 
program relies on many essential contributions from 
beyond the domain of its central team to accomplish 
its goals.
 
In the above statement, there is not a single men-
tion of any actions, deeds, or policies whatsoever. In a 
final flourish of suggested actions, in a section entitled 
“Personal Interactions as Compelling Messages,” the 
following are suggested as vital to improving U.S. 
credibility throughout the Muslim and Arabic world: 
the Fulbright scholarship program, foreign student 
exchange programs, U.S. Agency for International De-
velopment (USAID) programs, the Peace Corps, life-
saving outreach, and military to military exchanges.132 
It is hard to understand why “American Foreign 
and Military Policy in the Arab and Muslim World” 
are not included as having compelling messages. It 
is as if we cannot understand how someone can like 
you, but still not like what you are doing or have 
done; that one cannot believe that others really do 
not like how we treat (or they perceive how we treat) 
members of their brethren, despite the fact that, as a 
people and idea, America is viewed sympathetically. 
What we do, not who we are—not how nice, how 
generous, how good-hearted, how well-intentioned, 
how lofty our ideals and commitments to actualiz-
ing human potentials; our actions, deeds, and poli-
cies—is what is most troublesome and unenviable to 
these souls. 
After a decade’s struggle to conceptualize and 
execute a successful public diplomacy and strategic 
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communication, Congress, via The Duncan Hunter 
National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal 2009, 
required that the President submit “a comprehensive 
interagency strategy for public diplomacy and strate-
gic communication.” Between 2010-12, the President’s 
initial proposal, a Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) report on that proposal, and an updated presi-
dential proposal, were published.133 A decade’s debate 
and trial-and-error had further refined the strategic 
communications conceptual landscape; continued to 
identify the critical importance of policies, actions, 
and deeds; though yet again, one is left to feel that the 
proposed remedies fall far short of those required to 
refute, counter, and decimate AQ’s propaganda. 
The objective of strategic communication is clear: 
“sustaining global legitimacy and supporting our 
policy aims.”134 How shall this be done? Two distinct 
methods are advocated: more carefully aligning what 
we say and what we do (words and deeds); and being 
deliberate and engaged with the audiences we seek to 
influence.135 These two components comprise the very 
definition of strategic communication: 
(a) the synchronization of words and deeds and how 
they will be perceived by selected audiences, as well 
as (b) programs and activities deliberately aimed at 
communicating and engaging with intended audi-
ences, including those implemented by public affairs, 
public diplomacy, and information operations profes-
sionals (emphases added).136 
As conceived then, the problem of strategic com-
munication is primarily one of failed execution, or 
flawed organization and implementation—a failure to 
synchronize, a failure to deliberately engage—and not 
the problematic nature of present-day U.S. foreign and 
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military policies as communication. Or, so it appears. 
So let us examine what is meant by “synchronization” 
and “strategy for synchronization.”137
The following characterization is offered.138 Syn-
chronization requires:
•    Coordinating words and deeds, including the ac-
tive consideration of how our actions and policies 
will be interpreted by public audiences as an or-
ganic part of decisionmaking.
•  The recognition that what we do is often 
more important than what we say because ac-
tions have communicative value and send  
messages.
•  Fostering a culture of communication that val-
ues this type of synchronization and encourages 
decision-makers to take the communicative value 
of actions into account during their decisionmak-
ing. The most senior levels of government must 
advocate and implement a culture of communica-
tion that is reinforced through mechanisms and  
processes.
This declared necessity of word-deed synchroniza-
tion or word-deed consistency requires a “strategy for 
synchronization” which combines several declaratory 
sentences with suggested methods and means.139 
•  A key lesson we have learned is that actions be-
yond those managed by the communications com-
munity have communicative value and impact. 
Every action that the United States Government 
takes sends a message . . .
•     Importance of identifying, evaluating, and co-
ordinating the communicative value of actions 
as a proactive and organic part of planning and  
decisionmaking . . .
•  Ensure strategic goals and messages are well  
understood at all levels . . .
•  Raise awareness about the communicative im-
pact of decisions and actions [and] . . . empha-
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size the importance of considering such impacts  
proactively . . .
•  Ensure that forums exist for deliberating these 
impacts on high-priority issues and coordinat-
ing actions with deliberate communication and  
engagement.
The second base of strategic communication, “de-
liberate communication and engagement,” is charac-
terized as follows:
•  A wide range of [USG] programs and activities 
deliberately focused on understanding, engaging, 
informing, influencing, and communicating with 
people through public affairs, public diplomacy, 
information operations, and other efforts.
•  . . . Coordination mechanisms and processes to 
improve the United States Government’s ability 
to deliberatively communicate and engage with 
intended audiences.
The “Strategy for Deliberate Communication and 
Engagement”140 is comprised of the following:
•  Programs and activities focused on communicat-
ing and engaging with the public need to be strate-
gic and long-term, not just reactive and tactical.
•  [F]ocus on articulating what the United States is for, 
not just what we are against. For example, our efforts 
to communicate and engage with Muslim communities 
around the world must be defined primarily by a focus 
on mutual respect and mutual interest, even as we con-
tinue to counter violent extremism by focusing on dis-
crediting and delegitimizing violent extremist networks 
and ideology. (emphases added)
•  Deliberate communication also helps establish 
the strategic messages against which our actions 
are often judged by the public, and deliberate en-
gagement helps identify how our actions are being  
interpreted and perceived.
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•  It is vital that the United States is not focused sole-
ly on one-way communication, which is why we 
have consciously emphasized the importance of 
‘engagement’—connecting with, listening to, and 
building long-term relationships with key stake-
holders.141
Excepting the italicized bulleted point above—the 
single instance referred to of genuinely substantive in-
terests and policies—the document is an ode to meth-
odology emphasizing the essential need to orchestrate 
carefully words and actions, and make sure through 
deliberate engagement this synchronicity may be fur-
ther enhanced to advance U.S. policies. But, one may 
ask, which policies? Let us reproduce this italicized 
text and examine it, line by line. 
[F]ocus on articulating what the United States is for, 
not just what we are against. Is not the most telling 
proof of what a country is really “for” reflected in its 
policies, which, in turn, reflect vital interests, and ul-
timately core values? What we are “for” would then 
translate into the concrete commitments we have 
made, with blood and treasure, to uphold certain sets 
of social and political relationships, and not others. 
What we are “for” is what we promote and defend in 
domestic policies and in foreign and military policies, 
diplomatic policies and cultural policies. Is not “what 
we are for” to be judged based on actions, deeds done, 
commitments upheld, interests pursued? Or is “what 
we are for” a reference to the values we claim to up-
hold, the beliefs we maintain, the intentions we aspire 
to realize? The vagueness of the phrase “what we are 
for” serves to remove the harder edge of governments, 
peoples, militaries, security forces, police, prisons, and 
states of banishment or permission to live, from view. 
The same may be asked of its opposite, “what we 
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are against.” We are against oppression? Then what 
of crushing dictatorships? We value freedom? Then 
what of imprisoned activists? We value self-determi-
nation? Then what about banishment from the politi-
cal process? In the end, when the bodies and money 
are counted that “stand for” and “stand against” reali-
ties in the world, what should one determine “we are 
for” and “we are against.” This is the very opposite of 
vague phraseology. 
[O]ur efforts to communicate and engage with Muslim 
communities around the world must be defined primarily 
by a focus on mutual respect and mutual interest, even 
as we continue to counter violent extremism by focusing 
on discrediting and delegitimizing violent extremist net-
works and ideology. So, we are for “mutual respect” and 
“mutual interest.” But in concrete, substantive, policy 
terms, what does “mutual respect” and “mutual in-
terest” look like? Respect is demonstrated in actions, 
policies, and deeds, and quite evident when one be-
lieves their humanity, and that of their kinsmen, has 
been treated in a dignified, honorable, and deserving 
manner. Respect is earned when one is on the side of 
actively opposing indignities, ignoble deeds, unde-
served oppression, and humiliation. Mutual interests 
exist when one reciprocates and exchanges a good for 
a good, and when a common set of ultimate princi-
ples unite even persons otherwise quite different, to 
recognize, cooperate, and identify. Liberty, opportu-
nity, self-determination, sovereignty, dignity, family, 
development, peace, security, hope, health, wealth, 
wisdom . . . one can imagine any number of mutual 
interests that could be shared. But we must get far 
more concrete, and take into account whether present 
U.S. policies, based in specific alliances and a certain 
regime of stability, contain within themselves definite 
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limits that prohibit, in practice, the kind of respect and 
mutuality presumed above. If, in fact, a condition of 
authoritarian denial of rights and freedoms is logi-
cally predicated on the United States as guarantor or 
underwriter, what am I—an Arab, a Muslim, a man—
to conclude about the mutuality of our respect, and 
our interests?
“But I truly do care about you! I believe deeply in 
the sanctity of life, liberty, and opportunity!” To which 
a sober response might be: 
But the proof is in your policies, your deeds, and your 
actions my friend. It is in your alliances, allies, and in-
terests; it is in what you do, not what you say, or say 
about what you do. Israel, oil, and autocracy, is what 
I see. And it is I who pays that price, despite the no-
bility of the values you profess, and despite the very 
often generous spirit of your people who birthed the 
concepts I so seek for myself.
Not an insane retort to our baffled strategic communi-
cator, not at all.
The vital significance of U.S. foreign and military 
policy as a driver of Muslim attitudes and opinions, 
and not some generic opposition to Americans or 
American values per se, is also evident in other inde-
pendent analyses of and commentaries on U.S. stra-
tegic communication and public diplomacy. Only a 
brief selection from a vast literature is presented be-
low.142 An important 2003 report143 by the Center for 
the Study of the American Presidency, in analyzing 
the nature of the present U.S. credibility problem in 
the Muslim world, is explicit: This hostility is especial-
ly relevant to perceived U.S. support for Israel’s un-
just policies toward the Palestinians,144 but it extends 
well beyond.
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[N]egative Muslim attitudes toward the United States 
are not based on a general dislike of all things Ameri-
can or on a broader anti-Western outlook; nor are 
they derived from a clash of values brought about 
by globalization and modernization. Rather, as with 
anti-American sentiment among many non-Muslims, 
the principle source is aversion to U.S. policies. . . .  
[S]kepticism about the U.S role in promoting democ-
racy in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East is accom-
panied by a widespread belief that, while the United 
States voices support for democratization abroad, 
it supports autocratic regimes and helps ensure that 
democracy is denied to many Arabs and Muslims. De-
spite the broad support for democracy and civil rights 
in most Muslim countries, large numbers of Muslims 
believe they lack such basic liberties as fair elections, 
impartial judicial systems, freedom of the media from 
government censorship, and freedom to criticize their 
governments. The perception that America supports 
many authoritarian governments, at least indirectly, 
assists them in the suppression of these rights, espe-
cially in the Middle East, fuels anger at the United 
States, and its policies (bold in original).145  
Of the four major weaknesses evident in current 
public diplomacy efforts to combat anti-Americanism 
and the U.S. credibility deficit—U.S. policy, too little 
funds, sparse media, and a trickle of U.S. messaging 
swamped by a torrent of anti-U.S. messaging—it is 
U.S. policy which is regarded as decisive:
[T]he (often enormous) impact of U.S. policies eas-
ily overwhelms the effects of policy advocacy and 
other aspects of public diplomacy. The role that U.S. 
actions abroad, and increasingly at home, play in the 
formation of public attitudes overseas is far larger 
than that of U.S. communications with foreign audi-
ences. Public diplomacy has little effect when weighed 
against American policies that are perceived by for-
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eign audiences to have negative impacts on human 
rights, the local economy, or domestic politics (bold 
in original).146
A 2003 Report examining public diplomacy, evidenc-
ing the key role of policy yet limiting itself to a highly 
circumscribed mandate, asserts: 
We fully acknowledge that public diplomacy is only 
part of the picture. Surveys indicate that much of the 
resentment toward America stems from real conflicts 
and displeasure with policies, including those involv-
ing the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and Iraq. But our 
mandate is clearly limited to issues of public diplo-
macy, where we believe a significant new effort is  
required.147 
Concluding Thoughts: Formidable Challenges,
Formidable Opportunities.
Four conclusions—three obvious, and one coun-
terintuitive—are warranted by the above analysis. 
Let us consider the three compelling conclusions first. 
Though communication involves many potential mo-
dalities—words, symbols, and images for example—
policies, are also communication and as communi-
cation, USG policies are regarded by many analysts 
and experts and critics alike as the most persuasive 
signifier of genuine motives, intentions, values, and 
interests. 
Second, it is reasonable to conclude that opposi-
tion to specific U.S. foreign and military policies 
deemed unjust, undemocratic, and insensitive to hu-
man suffering and human rights—most especially 
U.S. policies privileging Israel, oil, and autocracy, at 
the expense of Palestine148 and broader democratic 
aspirations—not opposition to American values and 
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ideals, is a primary driver of anti-Americanism in the 
Arab and Muslim world. Though a small selection of 
reports and analyses was reviewed, a vast literature 
corroborating this conclusion exists.149 What we do in, 
for, and to the Arab and Muslim world—not our val-
ues or who we are as a people—fuel moral outrage. 
Indeed one may argue that it is precisely because 
we all share the same values—that all people should 
enjoy freedom and fairness rather than be subject to 
tyranny and torture—that U.S. policies perceived as 
underwriting or at least tolerating tyranny and torture 
are the root cause of this moral outrage.150
Third, U.S. policies that undermine U.S. credibility 
and inspire moral outrage serve to undermine other 
forms of communication, often designated “strategic 
communication” and “public diplomacy.” Analysts 
correctly conclude that no amount of lipstick can be 
put on these pigs that can successfully overwhelm 
the matter-of-fact experiences and perceptions of vast 
masses that associate U.S. interests with the subver-
sion of self-determination and social justice in the Arab 
and Muslim world. If a picture is worth a thousand 
words, how do actions, let alone a systematic policy 
maintained over years, convey this? If communication 
is 80 percent action and 20 percent words and if there 
is massive divergence between those words and ac-
tions, it is no wonder that USG public diplomacy and 
strategic communication have faltered so badly in the 
past decade. 
One might conclude from the above that the U.S. 
disadvantage owing to policy commitments is so se-
vere, even crippling, that the attempt to undermine 
radicalization and recruitment to the AQ terrorist en-
terprise and vision is a lost cause. But, a surprisingly 
opposite counterintuitive inference actually recom-
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mends itself. What has been proven is that current 
U.S. policies undermine U.S. credibility and inspire 
moral outrage, and undermine message resonance. 
What has not been proven is that official USG policies 
furnish evidence of any sort of a specifically anti-Mus-
lim animus, let alone a systematic war against Islam 
as a religious faith, or against Muslim adherents of 
that faith. There is, in short, nothing in the evidence 
above that proves the United States is a “Crusader” 
at war with Islam, or that U.S. interests, policies, and 
values, require that Islam—even in its robust form as 
an emboldened political Islam that views religion as 
a matter very much for the public sphere including 
law, culture, society, and state—be warred against. 
What has been proved above is that American 
policies are at war with American ideals—that our 
policy and our democratic social justice rhetoric ne-
gate one another. American claims to believe in val-
ues widely admired throughout the Arab and Muslim 
world are seen as hollow professions by a hypocritical 
and compromised superpower whose genuine com-
mitments are evident in its role as ultimate guarantor 
and military protector of an illegal Israeli occupation 
and usurpation of Palestinian aspirations, unhindered 
access to major oil reserves, and the regimes that are 
supported that make both possible, i.e., conservative 
and counter-revolutionary autocrats and monarchs, 
many of whom imprison and banish their democrat-
ic—religious or secular—opposition. Still, this is not a 
war against Islam, but a prejudice in favor of a regime 
of stability guaranteeing a particular status quo in the 
Occupied Territories and Middle East energy corri-
dors. It is not, then, an abandonment of a war against 
Islam that is required: quite the contrary. It is simply 
a rectification of existing policies to bring them into 
alignment with deeply held American ideals. 
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It is this credibility gap between professed aspira-
tions and self-evident policies that has been the USG’s 
Achilles heel. It undermines all other U.S. efforts to 
persuade the Muslim world we harbor no enmity.
It also furnishes the raw materials from which AQ 
draws its sophisticated terrorist propaganda. As will 
be shown later, it is AQ’s offensive war against all 
persons—whether autocratic regimes, American civil-
ians or military, or any Muslim who does not embrace 
AQ’s specific modus operandi—that has been success-
fully represented as a defensive war against the ene-
mies of Allah, Islam, and the broader faith community 
(umma). How is it that AQ—an offensive revolution-
ary, insurgent, terroristic  Islamist movement combin-
ing transnational objectives with pragmatic strategic 
doctrine—has successfully disabled the world’s only 
superpower from defending itself against the charge 
that the United States is an implacable foe of Islam; 
upholds an anti-Muslim status quo; subjects Muslims 
to barbaric and inhumane treatment throughout the 
world; and launches wars of occupation, subjugation, 
and humiliation? To return to Holbrooke’s perplexity, 
but shorn of his unwillingness or inability to seriously 
examine the moral outrage inspired by USG policies: 
“How could a mass murderer who publicly praised the 
terrorists of Sept. 11 be winning the hearts and minds 
of anyone? How can a man in a cave out communicate 
the world’s leading communications society?”151 
The second front in the War of Deeds then requires 
challenging AQ’s terroristic propaganda using actual 
deeds—those of the USG and those of AQ—to deter-
mine in fact, that AQ’s case may be undermined by a 
careful review of the evidence. It is to that task that we 
now turn. 
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CHALLENGING DEEDS: COUNTERING  
AL-QAEDA’S TERRORIST PROPAGANDA
Most, though not all, of the terrorism we face is fueled 
by a common ideology—a belief by some that Islam is 
in conflict with the United States, and the West, and 
that violence against Western targets, including civil-
ians, is justified in pursuit of a larger cause. Of course, 
this ideology is based on a lie, for the United States is 
not at war with Islam; and this ideology is rejected by 
the vast majority of Muslims, who are the most fre-
quent victims of terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, this 
ideology persists, and in an age in which ideas and 
images can travel the globe in an instant, our response 
to terrorism cannot depend on military or law enforce-
ment alone. We need all elements of national power to 
win the battle of wills and ideas.152 
The Vital Function of Propaganda in AQ’s  
Anti-American Terrorism.
Propaganda is a key method designed to influ-
ence the perception, morale, and will of various target 
populations. According to the official Department of 
Defense (DoD) definition, propaganda is “[a]ny form 
of adversary communication, especially of a biased or 
misleading nature, designed to influence the opinions, 
emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group, in order 
to benefit the sponsor, directly or indirectly.”153 What 
is key for our purposes is not that this is adversarial 
communication, or that it is a form of influence opera-
tions, but that AQ’s propaganda is dishonest, deceit-
ful, deliberately distorted disinformation designed to 
incite, inspire, agitate, and shape profoundly errone-
ous perceptions about USG intentions and actions 
vis-à-vis Islam and the Muslim world. That the USG 
suffers from a profound credibility crisis based in un-
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popular USG policies and actions is disadvantageous 
enough; consider, then, how this credibility deficit 
facilitates the work of skilled terrorist propagandists.
That is precisely the present conundrum facing those 
charged with strategic communication and public 
diplomacy, and it explains our continuing failure to 
undermine AQ’s propaganda juggernaut. It also ex-
plains how it is that thousands of persons are being 
mobilized worldwide to target what they are being 
told is an implacably evil enemy of Allah that must be 
neutralized by any means necessary.
The Terrorist Quadrangle: The Role and Function 
of Terrorist Propaganda as Communication.154
AQ’s terrorist propaganda is usefully conceptual-
ized as a distinct element of a quadrangle linking po-
litical object, propaganda, terrorist attack, and strate-
gic objectives. (See Figure 1.) 
Though top-down versus bottom-up processes of 
radicalization are differentially emphasized by ana-
lysts as key to AQ’s overall modus operandi,155 it is 
this writers’ belief that top-down, bottom-up, and 
interactive dynamics are all in play. Top-down di-
mensions include: AQ’s global media front, sophisti-
cated propaganda mission, assets dedicated to incit-
ing, catalyzing, mobilizing, educating and training; 
its conspiratorial cellular structure operating within 
both hostile environments and more friendly radi-
cal milieus to identify, target, and recruit potential 
operators; and, control of sanctuaries (including vir-
tual sanctuaries in cyberspace) permitting training in 
terrorist techniques, tactics, and methods. Bottom-up 
dimensions comprise processes of self-radicaliza-
tion, self-recruitment, and the ever more common
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Figure 1. AQ’s Terrorist Quadrangle: 
Relations of Political Object, Terrorist Propaganda, 
Terror Attacks, and Strategic Objective(s). 
phenomenon of isolated individuals and small groups 
of acquaintances, friends, or family self-mobilizing 
once they have been incited or inspired through 
moral outrage and energized by various social-psy-
chological processes to actively seek out AQ’s net-
work.156 This monograph assumes that both processes 
operate in highly complex ways and their interac-
tion must always be kept in mind when formulating 
concrete strategy. 
AQ’s terrorist propaganda is especially relevant to 
processes of home-based, home-grown (self-) radical-
ization and (self-) recruitment to AQ’s terrorist modus 
Terrorist
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(“Defending Islamic Umma 
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Strategic Objective(s)
1. Increase Al-Qaeda  and 
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3. Reorder sovereignty
4. Caliphal rulership
5. Base for Offensive Jihad
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operandi. Consider, for example, relations between 
tactical terrorist propaganda, fabricated agitational 
and inciteful disinformation and the three key psy-
chosocial variables identified earlier; perception, af-
fect, and behavior. In this case, terrorist propaganda 
is the proximate cause of a distorted perception of 
USG policies, moral indignation and outrage, and 
(self-) radicalization and (self-) recruitment to terror. 
Successful AQ tactical propaganda feeds and nour-
ishes behavioral radicalization by bringing to a white 
heat feelings of moral outrage based in a perception 
that the United States is the chief architect and arbi-
ter of an oppressive, unjust power structure crushing 
their Muslim and sisters. This moral outrage is based 
on perceptions of social injustice that increase one’s 
susceptibility to accepting the premise that the Unit-
ed States is an implacable enemy of Islam presently 
engaged in a systematic war against the worldwide 
Muslim umma; and, that terrorist actions are legiti-
mately directed against the USG, its interests, and its 
allies. This premise is both amplified and reinforced 
by the USG credibility crisis, based in a gulf between 
U.S. ideals and actions. Opposition to U.S. policies in-
cludes engaging in activities and finding outlets for 
securing retribution and justice such as joining ongo-
ing AQ campaigns and finding opportunities to die a 
shahid (martyr). Persons embarking on this path con-
ceive their actions as justified self-defense and not 
unjustified criminal murder. They believe they are 
assisting the oppressed and aggrieved, and fulfilling 
the general religious obligation within Islam for able-
bodied, capable, and knowledgeable persons to assist 
in whatever ways possible and legal to lift the bur-
dens of injustice and oppression from the shoulders 
of those presently in the clutches of their anti-Muslim 
oppressors. 
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The Critical Function of Counterpropaganda 
in Countering Insurgent Terrorism.
Deliberate and effective counterpropaganda is 
deemed essential by analysts and expert practitioners 
when the USG’s very credibility is at stake. It is also 
used to counter and deflate the agitation, incitement, 
and mobilization function of propaganda in the AQ 
terrorist quadrangle.157 Unfortunately, despite this 
admittedly critical role, recent changes in the official 
DoD lexicon have obscured the precise conception 
and definition of this task. As earlier defined, pro-
paganda is deemed something only adversaries do 
and is by nature disinformative. It is designed to use 
fabrications, manipulations, and techniques of influ-
ence, to gain advantages for one’s own interests at the 
expense of rationally conceived objective truth. Given 
this negative function, how, then, can counterpropa-
ganda be conceived?
 PSYOP, recently renamed Military Information 
Support Operations (MISO), was until recently the 
official name given by the DoD to the activity most 
resembling what one would imagine to be USG-based 
propaganda.158 A most terse definition is offered by 
U.S. Army Special Operations: “The mission of PSYOP 
is to influence the behavior of foreign TA’s [target au-
diences] to support U.S. national objectives.”159 This 
is not significantly different from the definition of 
propaganda cited above: 
[a]ny form of adversary communication, especially 
of a biased or misleading nature, designed to influ-
ence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of 
any group, in order to benefit the sponsor, directly or  
indirectly.
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 Let us now juxtapose the older, fuller PSYOP defi-
nition with its MISO replacement term.
[PSYOP]: Planned operations to convey selected in-
formation and indicators to foreign audiences to in-
fluence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, 
and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, 
organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose 
of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce 
foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the origi-
nator’s objectives.160 
[MISO]: Planned operations to convey selected in-
formation and indicators to foreign audiences to in-
fluence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, 
and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, 
organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner 
favorable to the originator’s objectives.161 
How Counterpropaganda Differs from Propaganda 
or PSYOP.
The function of propaganda, PSYOP or MISO, 
when stripped of euphemistic labels and spin, is to 
manipulate target audiences using known psycholog-
ical techniques so that one’s own interests are more 
likely to be realized. It is part of the broader art and 
science of influence operations, and deemed a vital di-
mension of warfare to the extent that attacking enemy 
morale, will, attitudes, perceptions, and emotions, is 
a key means of influencing an adversary’s behavior. 
Counterpropaganda as I conceive it, however, does 
not involve countering adversary propaganda with 
one’s own. Counterpropaganda is the refutation of fic-
tion by fact, not the opposing of one fiction to another.
In this monograph, counterpropaganda denotes 
the logical and factual refutation of an adversary’s 
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propaganda, where propaganda is identical to fab-
rication; disinformation; and deceitful, distorted, 
and dishonest communication. This refutation must 
be truthful, verifiable, credible, and subject to proof 
based on tests of external reliability performed by ob-
jective observers. Its chief objective in the war against 
AQ is first, to factually assess and evaluate the USG’s 
and AQ’s actual deeds in relation to the Arab and Is-
lamic worlds; and then, on the basis of such, formulate 
deliberate counter-AQ information warfare strategy. 
Conceived in this manner, counterpropaganda’s 
nearest relative is countering adversarial disinforma-
tion, or “counterdisinformation.” This latter term fails 
to signify that it is propaganda, and specifically ter-
rorist propaganda, rather than information, that is at 
issue in the terrorist quadrangle. Disinformation may 
be a subset of terrorist tasks, but the unique proper-
ties of propaganda are not conveyed by the sanitized 
term “information” any more than the term “Military 
Information Support Operations” accurately conveys 
its PSYOP function as military propaganda in support 
of national objectives.162 
ELEMENTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE  
USG COUNTERPROPAGANDA 
COUNTEROFFENSIVE 
In what follows, the chief elements of a counter-
propaganda counteroffensive against AQ are out-
lined. Beginning with a discussion and conception of 
influence operations, contemporary war and warfare, 
and the instruments of national power, attention is 
then turned to the key tasks required of the two fronts 
in the War of Deeds. 
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Influence Operations, Contemporary  
War, and Warfare. 
Influence Operations. 
Counterpropaganda must first be conceptual-
ized in relation to a broader concept of contemporary 
war, warfare, and influence operations. Influence op-
erations are those whose ultimate goal is to influence 
behavior in a manner favorable to its sponsor.163 In-
fluence operations address the full range of potential 
variables, including traditional kinetic means, that 
affect motivation, attitudes, beliefs, and ultimately 
behaviors. 
Contemporary War and Warfare. 
Influence is the chief objective of newer concep-
tions of war and warfare achieved via a vast terrain of 
social, technological, cultural, political, financial, and 
psychological methods and means. Today’s battlefield 
is not militarized and kinetic, but can be broadened to 
include a virtually inexhaustible and unrestricted mass 
of energy to be deployed in the service of policy.164 In 
relation to this concept of war and warfare, a recent 
author suggests the utility of discarding “conceptions 
of war and warfare that include only the traditional 
kinetic sense and instead think about forms of conflict 
that do not take lives or cause damage.”165 Consider, 
for example, the following conception: 
What is significant is that all of these warfighting 
means, along with their corresponding applications, 
that have entered, are entering, or will enter, the ranks 
of warfighting means in the service of war, have al-
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ready begun to quietly change the view of warfare 
held by all of mankind. Faced with a nearly infinite-
ly diverse array of options to choose from, why do 
people want to enmesh themselves in a web of their 
own making and select and use means of warfare that 
are limited to the realm of force of arms and military 
power? Methods that are not characterized by the use 
of the force of arms, nor even by the presence of ca-
sualties and bloodshed, are just as likely to facilitate 
the successful realization of the war’s goals, if not 
more so. As a matter of course, this prospect has led 
to revision of the statement that ‘war is politics with 
bloodshed’ [Clausewitz, Mao] and in turn has also led 
to a change in the hitherto set view that warfare pros-
ecuted through force of arms is the ultimate means of 
resolving conflict [Clausewitz, also p. 7, 36]. Clearly, it 
is precisely the means employed that has enlarged the 
concept of warfare. Moreover, the enlargement of the 
concept of warfare has, in turn, resulted in an enlarge-
ment of the realm of war-related activities. . . . Any war 
that breaks out tomorrow or further down the road 
will be characterized by warfare in the broad sense—
a cocktail mixture of warfare prosecuted through 
the force of arms and warfare that is prosecuted by 
means other than the force of arms. The goal of this 
kind of warfare will encompass more than merely ‘us-
ing means that involve the force of arms to force the 
enemy to accept one’s own will’ [Clausewitz]. Rather, 
the goal should be ‘to use all means whatsoever—
means that involve the force of arms and means that 
do not involve the force of arms, means that involve 
military power and means that do not involve military 
power, means that entail casualties and means that do 
not entail casualties—to force the enemy to serve one’s 
interests’.166
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From M, to Diplomatic, Informational, Military, 
and Economic (DIME), to DIMEFIL, to DICEFILM: 
On the Eight Instruments of National Power. 
A counterpropaganda campaign directed against 
AQ must also take into account the full range of ele-
ments and instruments of national power brought to 
bear on those three chief variables enabling terrorist 
actions: subjective motivation, subjective and objec-
tive capability, and objective opportunity. These eight 
major instruments of national power—diplomatic, 
informational, cyber, economic, financial, intelligence, 
legal, military—arrayed against these three variables 
are presented in Figure 2. 
Figure 2. Elements of a
Comprehensive USG Counterpropaganda 
Counteroffensive to Combat  Radicalization 










          Combating the Three Bases Enabling  Terrorist Behavior 








 DIPLOMATIC  INFORMATIONAL  CYBER  ECONOMIC 
FINANCIAL  INTELLIGENCE  LEGAL  MILITARY 
Counter AQ messaging through systematic 
counter-propaganda in word, and deed. USG 
policies  enhance and reinforce resonance 
Counter AQ messengers through HVT, discrediting and 
delegitimizing, credible alternative messengers 
Counter AQ media through targeted removal, infiltration, 
delegitimation, credible alternative media 
“The United States is NOT 
and has NEVER  been at war 
with Islam. This is proven by 
our words, deeds, and 
actions.”  
“Al Qaeda’s terrorism violates 
Islamic law, is responsible for 
major sins, undermines Muslim 
interests, and uses murder, 
force, and fear to impose its will 
on others.”  
 
Counter AQ messaging through systematic 
counterpropaganda in word, and deed. USG 
policies enhance and reinforce resonance
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As one can see in Figure 2, inclusion of the cyber 
(C) domain extends the principal instruments of na-
tional power beyond their originally-conceptualized 
four (DIME), and more recent extension to seven by 
adding the financial, intelligence, and legal domains 
(DIMEFIL or MIDLIFE),167 to eight in order to fully 
capture the means employed in the digital revolution 
manifest in cyberspace.168 Well attested in recent doc-
trine and analyses,169 and obviously central to the do-
main of countering AQ propaganda, this essential ele-
ment of national power must now be given its proper 
recognition.170
Countering AQ Propaganda: 
The Primacy of the War of Deeds.
Next, I briefly describe the two key fronts in a 
War of Deeds designed to counter AQ terrorist pro-
paganda. By deftly organizing a sustained War of 
Deeds and, as a result, eviscerating AQ’s credibility, 
the nexus between terrorist propaganda and terrorist 
acts (see Figure 1) is severed. Ideally, this means that 
an effectively sustained USG campaign can cripple 
and render impotent AQ’s capacity to incite moral 
outrage, radicalize, and earn new recruits as so-called 
vanguard of a besieged.
The premise of a War of Deeds is that defeating 
AQ does not require mimicking enemy tactics through 
manipulation of evidence, spin, tricks or deceptive 
arts of any sort. Instead it requires the confident de-
ployment of human reason and martialing of genu-
ine evidence that can in the long run triumph over 
fabrications, propaganda, disinformation, and AQ’s 
violent offensive war against all who disagree with its 
political objectives, especially its terrorist modus ope-
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randi. Veracity and credibility rather than perfection 
of USG deeds is key to a War of Deeds. An objective, 
factual investigation of U.S. actions will not confirm 
any kind of Crusader war against Islam. Reason and 
evidence, duly combined, will reveal tractable clashes 
of interests; intracivilizational fault lines over religion 
and state; intercivilizational dialogue and conflict 
over core conceptions, and even potential intercivili-
zational conflicts, and even occasional clashes. It will 
not confirm, even remotely, however, a Crusader war 
against Islam. Undoubtedly some elements within 
U.S. society do seek a neo-Crusader agenda. This in-
cludes a Christian Zionist, Zionist, and neo-conserva-
tive political coalition which denies the policy roots 
of anti-U.S. animus. Instead it argues exclusively for 
war-footing against a supposedly ignoble Islamic or ji-
hadist enemy found in virtually all guises—including 
the bogeyman of the Muslim Brotherhood. Undoubt-
edly, this extremely powerful political coalition func-
tions within the United States to prejudice policies and 
foreign relations.171 Despite this, however, no rational 
analysis of USG policies, deeds, and actions confirms 
that it is official or unofficial USG policy to wage war 
on Islam, Muslims, or the Arab Muslim world. 
Countering AQ Messengers and Media. 
A counterpropaganda counteroffensive along the 
lines of the War of Deeds suggested here has as its 
chief goal using three key elements—the media, mes-
sengers, and messages—to undermine motivation via 
incitement to moral outrage, and thereby radicaliza-
tion and recruitment to AQ terrorism. Let us begin 
with the latter two first. As Figure 2 describes, coun-
tering AQ propaganda requires countering AQ’s mes-
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sengers. The specific methods, tactics, techniques, and 
procedures (TTPs) specific to this objective include: 
eliminating AQ propagandists through deliberate 
targeting in ongoing HVT campaigns (e.g., Anwar al-
Awlaki and Abu Yahya al-Libi); infiltrating AQ ori-
ented internet chat rooms and fora with the objective 
of discrediting and delegitimizing AQ’s messengers 
by countering disinformation, exploiting contradic-
tions, and exposing fallacies; using the weapons of 
ridicule, satire, and character assassination to destroy 
messenger credibility;172 finally, attempts to recruit al-
ternative messengers whose bona fide credibility may 
be leveraged to further damage AQ’s jihadist brand.173 
Second, AQ media must be countered, using such 
methods and TTPs as targeted removal, infiltration, 
delegitimation of AQ media and sources, and legiti-
mizing alternative credible media sources that effec-
tively challenge AQ’s propagandistic assertions. 
Countering AQ’s Two Greatest Lies Using a  
War of Deeds. 
Destroying AQ’s messengers and media, and en-
hancing U.S. media and messenger credibility is nec-
essary, but insufficient. The knock-out blow, I believe, 
results when the USG overtly, directly, and effectively 
challenges and refutes AQ’s most essential messages 
in a War of Deeds. As Figure 3 indicates, there are two 
vital “great lies” that AQ starkly juxtaposes—“The 
U.S. Crusader” and “The Islamic Defender”—that 
must be countered effectively in this War of Deeds. 
To refute these great lies requires two countermes-
sages. Message 1: “The United States is NOT and has 
NEVER been at war with Islam. This is proven by our 
words, deeds, actions, and policies.” Message 2: “The 
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Al-Qaeda terrorist entity is a violent criminal enter-
prise that violates Islamic law, is responsible for major 
sins, undermines Muslim interests, and uses murder, 
force, and fear to impose its will on others.” Each 
message, when combined in a sustained campaign, 
counters these great lies using concrete facts, actual 
policies, actions, and deeds associated with the USG 
and AQ. To facilitate this task, let us juxtapose AQ’s 
two greatest lies (propaganda) and the USG messages 
(counterpropaganda) required to refute them:
Figure 3. Method for Refuting AQ’s Big Lies.  
Method for Refuting AQs Big Lie #1.
AQ’s first big lie—The U.S. Crusader War against 
Islam—rests on five fabrications alleged as matters of 
indisputed empirical fact, which have been central to 
its earliest declarations of war in 1996 and 1998, justify-
ing the killing of Americans, civilian and military, and 
repeatedly throughout subsequent communiques.174 
Each of these fabrications may be treated as premises, 
and AQ’s first big lie as the alleged conclusion. 
AQ Great Lie #1:
The United States is engaged in a 
Crusader-Zionist war against Islam 
and the Muslim world.
USG Refutation of Great Lie #1:
The United States is NOT and has 
NEVER been at war with Islam. This 
is proven by our words, actions, 
deeds, and policies.
AQ Great Lie #2:
AQ is fighting a defensive jihad to 
protect the Muslim umma and Islam 
from an offensive Crusader-Zionist 
War.
USG Refutation of Great Lie #2:
The AQ criminal terrorist enterprise 
violates Islamic law, commits major 
sins, undermines Muslim interests, 
and uses murder, force, and fear to 
impose its will on others.
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Premise 1: The Murderer of Muslim Millions. The 
United States is directly or indirectly responsible for 
the murder of millions of Muslim men, women, and 
children.
Premise 2: The Apostate Installer-Defender. The 
United States rules directly or indirectly through anti-
Muslim apostate governments it installs, maintains, 
and defends throughout the Muslim world. 
Premise 3: The Imperialist-Exploiter. The United 
States maintains a purely imperialist, exploitative, 
and predatory relationship to Middle East oil supplies 
and is pillaging the wealth of the Muslim world. 
Premise 4: The Aggressive Permanent Occupier. U.S.-
led military operations in Afghanistan, and earlier 
Iraq, and at present throughout the Muslim world, 
are militant offensive wars motivated by a desire to 
destroy Islam, permanently occupy Muslim lands, 
or rule indirectly through anti-Muslim apostate 
governments.
Premise 5: The U.S.-Zionist Plot to Create Israel to 
Divide and Destroy the Umma. The state of Israel was 
created as part of a Western colonial plot to establish a 
Crusader-Zionist beachhead at the center of the Mus-
lim world to divide, weaken, and eventually uproot 
Islam from Palestine and the greater Middle East. 
Steadfast U.S. support for Israel is motivated primar-
ily by that anti-Muslim colonial intention.
These five fabrications have gone essentially un-
challenged to the present day. Whether refuting them 
is considered the equivalent of refuting holocaust de-
niers or 9/11 truthers, or flat-earthers, or martialing 
facts has lost out to the so-called “battle of ideas,” not 
taking these as deadly serious in the context of the 
USG credibility deficit, over the course of a decade, 
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has permitted fictions to become living legends with 
predictably deadly consequences.175 If one chooses, 
one can also use concepts derived from framing the-
ory176 to perceive these five fabrications as alleged 
empirical nodes supporting AQ’s anti-American 
“injustice frame.” By effectively countering these 
fabrications, one obliterates the supporting tissue of 
this injustice frame that inspires moral outrage and 
animates recruits. 
It is not a far stretch to see how an angry, newly-
inspired, morally-outraged young recruit could be led 
through the lens of AQ’s sophisticated propaganda to 
see present U.S. policy commitments as motivated pri-
marily by anti-Muslim animus. Instead of privileging 
access to oil reserves, the United States is a pillager-
exploiter (Premise 3). Instead of a very powerful lobby 
in defense of Israel’s security and expansion, which 
in effect, permits an illegal occupation, settlement, 
and continuing humiliation of the Palestinian people 
to persist, the United States has an ultimate divide 
and conquer strategy (Premise 5). Instead of a policy 
that privileges conservative, stability-promoting anti-
democratic autocrats and monarchs, the United States 
is an apostate installer-defender (Premise 2).  
Objective, factual, historical evidence is all that is 
required to refute AQ’s five fabrications (premises) and 
first big lie (conclusion). A sound argument consists of 
true and relevant premises from which a conclusion 
necessarily follows. It will be essential that such facts 
are considered credible, thus requiring credible mes-
sengers and media, for their legitimacy. 
While U.S. analysts are certainly capable of dis-
covering, arranging, and communicating such facts, 
a curiously powerful messenger and source of cred-
ibility should also be leveraged: committed Islamists 
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whose militant bona fides are unassailable, but who 
offer decisive evidence refuting AQ’s fabricated pro-
pagandistic history of U.S. involvement in the Arab 
and Muslim world. Consider the following realistic 
rather than propagandistic account provided by lead-
ers of the Egyptian Islamic Group (Al Gama’a al-Is-
lamiyya)—opposed on grounds of principle, legality, 
and pragmatics to AQ’s terroristic modus operandi—
of U.S. core strategic interests and their implications 
for U.S. relations with the Islamic world.
The conception that America is waging a Crusade 
against Muslims is not true. . . . in the worst of cases 
[one can say that] at times there have been American 
policies that have had a religious dimension in oppos-
ing some—and not all—of the Islamic world’s causes. 
[The fact that this is not a Crusade] explains Ameri-
ca’s positive stand in support of the Afghani mujahi-
deen in their fight against the Soviet occupation, and 
[America’s] positive stand [against] the ethnic cleans-
ing operation against the Muslims of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina and in the province of Kosovo. Likewise, 
the conception that America aimed to bring down the 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan and could not have 
been deterred from doing so is not true. Reality attests 
to the fact that America attempted to come to terms 
with the Taliban regime in order to realize common 
strategic goals . . . and these attempts to come to an 
understanding ran up against the Al-Qaeda organiza-
tion’s actions, which were launched from Afghanistan 
and targeted America, and which the Taliban authori-
ties did not restrain.177 . . . America at that time was 
looking for new strategies for a new century, and if the 
Front [i.e., Al-Qaeda] and other interpreters of Islam 
had adopted serious Islamic strategy that would have 
given consideration to American interests together 
with Islamic interests, this would have prevented the 
continuation of this war or [at least] would have kept 
it from taking on a comprehensive nature.178
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An earlier work authored by this same organiza-
tion deeply critical of AQ179 provides an even broader, 
in-depth account and rendering of key U.S. objectives 
vis-à-vis the Muslim world.
In this chapter, the leaders of the Egyptian Al-Jama’ah 
Al-Islamiyah review and assess strategy on the issues 
of the Muslim world in an attempt to answer several 
important questions necessitated by current world 
events: Did U.S. strategy target the Muslim world or 
not? Are we in a state of self-defense that allows Al-
Qaida to do what it wants? The authors argue that 
Al-Qaida’s interpretation of U.S. strategy is not accu-
rate but is characterized, as they say, with unfairness. 
The authors say that any observer of U.S. strategy will 
find that the prime mover of this strategy is interests 
and not the religious factor. This explains many ma-
jor events in which the United States appeared to be 
supportive of some Islamic issues, such as support for 
the Afghan jihad in 1979 against the Soviet presence. 
The leaders of Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyya divide this 
U.S. strategy into three phases. The first starts with the 
end of the First World War in 1945 [sic] until the end 
of the Cold War in December 1991 with the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. The second phase begins in 1991 
until the [1998] proclamation of the World Front to 
Combat the Jews and the Crusaders [by AQ] and the 
start of operations against the United States. The third 
phase stretches from 11 September 2001 events to [the 
present] date. At the end of their evaluation of the 
U.S. strategy, the authors conclude that Al-Qa’ida’s 
strategy was one of the most important factors that 
hastened the formulation of this U.S. strategy that is 
negative toward the Muslim world.180
Method for Refuting AQs Big Lie #2. 
The War of Deeds is especially appropriate for 
refuting AQ’s propaganda that it is the vanguard 
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fighting a defensive war against a Crusader-Zionist 
alliance. The five premises similarly service this con-
clusion; exposing the fabricated nature of those prem-
ises suffices then, to render this conclusion invalid. 
Whereas the previous task requires refuting lies 
that radically impugn USG credibility, the task here 
is confirming facts that impugn AQ’s credibility. Be-
cause AQ fights in the name of Islam and defends its 
actions in terms of a strict, classical interpretation of 
the shari’a regulating the lawful waging of the jihad, 
radically impugning AQ’s credibility means exposing 
not only its empirical fabrications, but its legal-moral 
violations, i.e., sinfulness. 
Jurisprudence and Fiqh al-Jihad. 
Far from fighting a defensive jihad against Cru-
saders, AQ is in fact a criminal terrorist enterprise 
that is guilty of egregious violations of Islamic law, 
including the commission of major sins such as: inten-
tional homicide, deemed unpardonable on the Day of 
Judgment; imprudent sacrificing of Muslim interests 
throughout the world; and violating generally expect-
ed norms of humane conduct by using murder, force, 
and fear to impose its will on others. Let us consider 
each in turn.
The jihad of the sword (jihad bis saif)181 is strictly 
regulated by classical sources of orthodox religious 
authority. AQ claims to uphold faithfully the classi-
cal shari’a of lawful jihad by strictly adhering to the 
path of al salaf al salih (the path followed by the “righ-
teous” ancestors). These earliest companions of and 
successors to Prophet Muhammad furnish for genu-
ine salafists the normative ideal of righteous intention 
and conduct, including the conduct of jihad. AQ also 
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claims to strictly abide by an established body of law 
(fiqh) transmitted by classical religious scholar-jurists 
prescribing and regulating jihad fi sabil Allah (jihad in 
the path of Allah). The most damaging case against 
AQ arises when these shari’a sources are marshaled 
to persuasively demonstrate that absolutely forbid-
den (haram) violations have been perpetrated. Should 
AQ’s terroristic modus operandi demonstrate discon-
tinuity, innovation, and forbidden acts that contradict 
Prophet Muhammad’s “sunna”—though marketed in 
AQ apologetics as the “salafi-jihadi” path—its viola-
tion of the classical jihad would be proven, and its le-
gitimacy impaled.182 
Devastating cases against AQ’s violations of fiqh 
al-jihad exist, and should be fully leveraged to prove 
that AQ is guilty of murderous jihadism and has in 
fact innovated a doctrine of “killing in masse” predi-
cated on engaging in many legally/morally forbid-
den acts. Among these forbidden acts are: the killing 
of several categories of person—Muslim and non-
Muslim—whose blood, reputation, and property are 
strictly protected under Islamic law; violation of the 
shari’a regulating the use of human shields in com-
bat; violation of the law of retribution or lex talionis; 
violation of laws forbidding treachery and the break-
ing of covenants; and killing persons on the basis of 
nationality.183
Prudence and Muslim Interests. 
Prudential critiques are also key to obliterating 
AQ’s propaganda, which asserts it fights on behalf 
of Muslims and is essential to the defense of Islamic 
lands and power. To the contrary, AQ’s murderous 
jihadism is responsible for a host of consequences. 
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What follows is a short list. AQ has caused the fall of 
the Taliban regime. It has besmirched a great faith, Is-
lam, by equating it in the minds of a broader public 
with barbaric terror. AQ’s actions have created greater 
support for a securitized environment that has placed 
Muslims, and others, in a far more precarious position 
vis-à-vis the free exercise of civil liberties, than pre-
viously. AQ has de-legitimized the broader Islamist 
resurgence in the minds of a broader public seeking 
along with other actors, to democratically contest 
existing unpopular, autocratic regimes. Fiqh al-jihad 
requires that the decision to wage the jihad of the 
sword take into account the probability of success, the 
relative benefits and costs to Islam of the choice to use 
force, and takes full advantage of many other permis-
sible and recommendable means that may be used to 
spread the worship and Word of Allah.184 
Ethics and Human Morality. 
AQ’s use of murder, force, and fear—the essence 
of its modus operandi as a criminal terrorist orga-
nization—denies human individuals, Muslim and 
non-Muslim, the right to choose alternative paths 
and means for realizing aspirations in the contempo-
rary world. Terror as a fear-generating tool designed 
to instill dread in order to attain power over others 
undermines the fundamental sense of personal se-
curity: a security without which the exercise of free-
dom and liberty is not possible.185 AQ is, at its root, 
in permanent war with any and all Muslims and 
non-Muslims, who dissent from its path of murderous 
jihadism. 
Despite opposition to USG policies, overwhelming 
majorities of Muslim and non-Muslim alike view ter-
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rorism as a morally reprehensible means for achieving 
power over others. They view nonviolent, democratic 
means as a superior means of fighting for one’s rights 
and freedoms, as well as for selecting representatives 
who are replaceable and accountable to the governed. 
These overwhelming majorities do not view democ-
racy as a substitute religion involving a worshipful 
relation or replacement of an Almighty by man. Rath-
er, they view democracy as the most effective means 
of ensuring that man, as a morally challenged being 
fraught with vices and temptations and desires, be 
subject to accountable laws and governments, and not 
the tyranny of an unchosen dictator, or self-appointed 
vanguard. The “take away” message for the USG of 
this most American of ideals—self-determination un-
der an elected and accountable government under 
law—seems obvious. “Better relations with Arab soci-
eties as a whole,” Jamal Amay of Princeton’s Depart-
ment of Politics, recently asserts:186
will require reconsidering U.S. policies that ignore the 
preferences of ordinary citizens, such as continuing to 
back authoritarian regimes, increasing drone attacks 
in the region, and supporting the ongoing Israeli oc-
cupation of the West Bank. A carefully constructed 
foreign policy will have to take into account the pref-
erences of millions of Arabs across the region. . . . 
There is no evidence of some deep and durable Arab 
hatred of the United States. . . . [C]itizens across the 
region recognize that there is much to gain from closer 
ties to the United States. A carefully designed U.S. 
foreign policy should ensure that the United States’ 
geostrategic plans incorporate, rather than alienate,  
those citizens.187
The “take away” message for AQ is also clear. AQ’s 
insurgent terror is now, and into an indefinite but 
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certain future, in irreconcilable conflict with this vast 
majority’s sense of decency, morality, and its chosen 
path forward. Imploding from within, and marginal-
ized from without, AQ shall in time meet the fate—
oblivion—of every known terrorist enterprise. Having 
wreaked havoc now for nearly a quarter century, it is 
well time for those possessed of facts, to fight AQ’s 
fabrications. The time for a determined, systematic 
counterpropaganda counteroffensive fought along 
the lines suggested above, has arrived. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGY
Ways, Means, and Ends.
Strategy entails that one specify the way in which 
means are used to accomplish ends.188 The end speci-
fied in in this monograph is the second strategic objec-
tive outlined in the 9/11 Commission Report: countering 
radicalization and recruitment to AQ. The way is the 
concept or method for achieving that strategic objec-
tive. In this case, I am suggesting that U.S. strategists 
use a unique way/methodology: Fighting the War of 
Deeds. This methodology emphasizes the communi-
cative nature, function, and value of policies, deeds, 
and actions as drivers of anti-Americanism in the 
Arab and Muslim world. This method is offered as a 
distinct supplement, complement, or most likely sub-
stitute, for what I deem a mostly ill-advised effort to 
craft persuasive messaging using public diplomacy, 
strategic communication, or other persuasive arts that 
do not begin with and leverage the power of deeds. 
The means suggested involve all eight instru-
ments of national power described above. If policy 
is communication, each of these instruments must 
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function in harmony to undermine AQ’s two greatest 
lies. A range of agencies and personnel are focused 
on countering radicalization and recruitment to AQ, 
and “means” therefore applies to all organizational, 
financial, and personnel-based resources that must be 
deployed to realize this objective. 
Strategic Validity. 
The validity of a strategy requires that it accom-
plish its desired strategic effect (suitability), is backed 
by sufficient resources (sustainability), and is deemed 
legitimate, relative to costs and benefits, among rel-
evant publics (acceptability). Assuming resource suf-
ficiency, I here address the first and third elements. 
Suitability. The analysis above confirms the re-
sounding emphasis—across a range of experts, litera-
ture, reports, and political orientations—of the critical 
significance of deeds as communication. The method-
ology of Fighting the War of Deeds is therefore ground-
ed in known facts and experience regarding the vari-
ety of modes available in persuasive communication, 
and the suitability/efficacy of deeds as chief among 
them. The War of Deeds is especially suited for the 
present propaganda-rich environment in which coun-
tering radicalization and recruitment to AQ among 
morally indignant, home-based and home-grown ter-
rorist self-starters has become critical. The overriding 
emphasis on perceptions of U.S. injustice toward the 
Muslim world among this population requires that 
policies speak loudly and powerfully enough to quell 
doubts and undermine AQ’s viral reach. 
Acceptability. The War of Deeds is likely to meet 
resistance among certain sub-populations who con-
sider themselves beneficiaries of present U.S. foreign 
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and military policy in the Arab and Muslim world. It is 
also likely to meet resistance among a broader Ameri-
can populace who may believe that carefully examin-
ing U.S. foreign and military policy, and perceptions 
of that policy amount to “rewarding” terrorism. It will 
require a determined effort to prove that, in fact, one 
may develop new understandings without sanction-
ing terrorism or AQ’s murderous jihadism, as a legiti-
mate means of addressing existing injustices. Taking 
the initiative to clarify and define present policies and 
their implications for future relations with the Arab 
and Muslim world is highly advisable; fighting an ill-
defined “war of ideas” as a reaction to AQ’s bloody 
provocations and perfidious methods, is not.
Strategic Risks.
Strategic risk must consider the probable conse-
quences of success and failure of a given strategy. It 
asks the question: Given this unique strategy, and in 
the context of this strategic environment, what strate-
gic effects are likely to be created by the implementa-
tion of this strategy? Many other questions must also 
be raised: How will this strategy affect the present 
equilibrium among actors? What potential unintend-
ed effects, and second- and third-order effects, exist? 
CONCLUSION
I will close this monograph on a note of genuine 
humility and state that I must leave to genuine strate-
gists the careful, methodical evaluation of these po-
tential risks arising from vigorously fighting a War of 
Deeds as proposed here. It is my firm conviction that 
the United States of America is—owing to its youthful 
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18th century provenance and pioneering role as cre-
ator, defender, and promoter of democratic ideals—
on the right side of history, while AQ faces inexorable 
implosion and marginalization and an inevitable de-
mise. Its global ambitions, murderous methods, and 
arrogant pretensions condemn it to wreaking havoc 
and parasitizing chaos. I firmly believe that the long 
process of reconstructing states, legitimacy, and 
boundaries now unfolding throughout the fermenting 
Arab and Muslim world naturally benefits the United 
States, and we, them. We are both, we are all, aspir-
ing to realize, and not negate, functioning, produc-
tive, sociopolitical, socioeconomic, and sociocultural 
orders. For those reasons, it seems to me that the risk 
of not acting boldly to proclaim an enduring alliance 
with this emergent order and its Sunni majority is 
far greater than the risks we face, as nation after na-
tion deposes its autocrats and dictators and possibly 
also its monarchs. Must we, having failed to develop 
a post-autocratic, post-Cold War vision, vacillate be-
tween embracing the autocrats who guarantee short-
term regime stability and the democrats—Muslim 
and secular—who seek to dethrone them? I believe 
a natural, long-term alliance and dialogue of civili-
zations is in the making and that possibly the great-
est risk of all is failing to understand that the older 
algorithm—oil, Israel, and autocracy—does not give 
way to a fuller conception. One, in short, that does not 
require lipstick.
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DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, No. 23, Janu-
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Around the World, New York, Social Science Research Council, 
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eds., Democracy and Counterterrorism: lessons from the past, “Con-
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dad and Hilal Khashan, “Islam and Terrorism: Lebanese Muslim 
Views on September 11,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 46, No. 
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fred A. Knopf, 2006, esp. pp. 284-285; Michael B. Meyer, Major, 
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ment of the Graduation Requirements, Maxwell Air Force Base, 
AL: Air and Staff Command College, Air University, March 19, 
2002; Mahmood Mamdani, “Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: A Po-
litical Perspective on Culture and Terrorism,” Eric Hershberg and 
Kevin W. Moore, Critical Views of September 11, pp. 44-60; Major 
Roy P. Matur, USAF, Influencing Transnational Terrorist Organiza-
tions: Using Influence Nets to Prioritize Factors, June 2005, Graduate 
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Operational Sciences, AFIT/GOS/ENS/05-06, Wright-Patterson 
Air Force Base, OH: Air University, Department of the Air Force, 
Air Force Institute of Technology, esp. pp. iv, 16-31, available 
from www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/afit/fatur_influences_terrorists.
pdf; Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Recent U.S. Think-
ing About Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 2010, Vol. 
22, esp. 647; Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Logic of Suicide Terror-
ism, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005; Robert Pape 
and J. Feldman, Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Suicide Terrorism 
and How to Stop It, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2010; 
PEW Global Attitudes Project, December 19 2001; Marc Sageman, 
Leaderless Jihad: Terrorist networks in the 21st Century, Philadelphia, 
PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009, esp. p. 35-36; Brent 
J. Talbot and Michael B. Meyer, View from the East: Arab Percep-
tions of United States Presence and Policy, Institute for National Se-
curity Studies (INSS) Occassional Paper No. 48, USAF Academy, 
CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, February 2003; 
Sherifa Zuhur, Precision in the Global War on Terror: Inciting Mus-
lims Through the War of Ideas, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies In-
stitute, U.S. Army War College, April 2008, available from www.
StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil, esp. p. 118. 
150. See also Kamolnick, Delegitimizing Al-Qaeda, note 72, pp. 
59-64 (Simon Reeve, The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Lad-
en, and the future of terrorism, Boston, MA: Northeastern University 
Press, 1999, “Appendix Three: A letter from Ramzi Yousef and the 
other conspirators in the World Trade Center bombing, published 
as received by The New York Times 4 days after the February 1993 
explosion,” pp. 274-275):  “Ramzi Yousef, mastermind of the 1993 
World Trade Center plot, as well as others, including the initial 
planning of the ‘Planes Operation’—who had earlier failed in an 
attempt to bomb the Israeli embassy in Bangkok, Thailand, and 
whose initial New York targets were not the World Trade Center 
but targeting Jewish neighborhoods in Crown Heights and Wil-
liamsburg— had this to say as a final statement following his con-
viction for that crime:
We are, the fifth battalion in the Liberation Army, declare 
our responsibility for the explosion on the mentioned 
building. This action was done in response for the Ameri-
can political, economical and military support to Israel the 
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state of terrorism and to the rest of the dictator countries in  
the region.
Our demands:
Stop all military, economical, and political aids [sic] to Israel.
All diplomatic relations with Israel must stop.
Not to interfere with any of the Middle East countries [sic] 
interior affairs.
. . . The terrorism that Israel practices (which is supported 
by America) must be faced with a similar one. The dictator-
ship and terrorism (also supported by America) that some 
countries are practicing against their own people must also 
be faced with terrorism.
 The American people must know, that their civilians 
who got killed are not better than those who are getting 
killed by the American weapons and support.
 The American people are responsible for the actions of 
their government and they must question all of the crimes 
that their government is committing against other people. 
Or they – Americans – will be the targets of our operations 
that could diminish them.
 We invite all of the people from all countries and all of 
the revolutionaries in the world to participate in this action 
with us to accomplish our just goals.
 ‘IF THEN ANYONE TRANSGRESSES THE PROHI-
BITION AGAINST YOU TRANSGRESS YE LIKEWISE 
AGAINST HIM. . . . 
    Al-Farbek Al-Rokn,
    Abu Bakr Al-Makee 
CNN, in its write-up of the final verdict, represented facts 
by stating: “After 3 days of deliberation in November, a federal 
jury convicted Yousef and Eyad Ismoil on murder and conspiracy 
charges for their roles in a plot by Islamic extremists to topple the 
trade centers two 110-story [sic] towers to punish the United States 
for its support of Israel,” available from articles.cnn.com/1998-01-
08/us/980108 yousef 1 trade-center-bombing-yousef-and-eyad-ismoil-
conviction-S=PM:US. Finally, at least one of the East Africa Em-
bassy bombers made his motives known in published transcripts 
of the case (See United States of America v. Usama bin Laden, et al., 
S(7) 98 Cr. 1023, United States District Court, Southern District of 
New York, New York, N.Y., October 18, 2001, Sentencing hearing, 
available from fl1.findlaw.com/news/findlaw.com/cnn/docs/binladen/
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usbinldn101801.) El Hage’s complicity in the attacks was proved, 
but based on his testimony one learns that policy, not shari’a, pri-
marily motivated him; also, that the killing of innocent human be-
ings—something he apparently did not know would happen—is 
absolutely unacceptable under Islamic law. The defendants, Wa-
dih El Hage, Mohamed Sadeek Odeh, Mohamed Rashed Daoud 
Al-‘Owhali, and Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, all received life 
without parole: Odeh’s views (see p. 112) are referred to by Judge 
Leonard B. Sand when he states as their motives, “Mr. Odeh’s 
opposition to United States’ support of Israel, financially, politi-
cally and militarily, [and] presence of the United States military 
in the holy lands of Saudi Arabia, [and] the Persian Gulf and the 
Horn of Africa . . .” At p. 113, Judge Sands states: “The attack may 
have been intended to attack American foreign policy, but the vic-
tims were innocent people. . . .” At pp. 115-116, the distinction 
is made between support of al-Qaeda’s military goals and deep 
regret at loss of innocent civilian life. Odeh’s attorney, Anthony L. 
Ricco, states: 
He is now prepared to face the sentence that the court must 
impose here. He is very much aware of the substantial hu-
man loss that occurred here. He is not oblivious to the fact 
that many people were injured and many people died here 
who were innocent. He acknowledged that very early on 
in the case when he was interrogated. He has always ex-
pressed that. He does not have remorse, your Honor, about 
his participation in Al Qaeda. That’s a difference in his 
mind. . . . Mohamed Odeh has always stated that he was not 
a part of the execution of the bombing. He continues in that 
position today, but that does not mean, your Honor, that 
he is a person who is oblivious to the great loss of human 
life and the great injury that was inflicted upon people here  
(pp. 115-116).
El-Hage, a second defendant, addressed the Court before his sen-
tencing with a very revealing, fundamentalist narrative, but one 
that appears to recognize the enormity of killing innocents and 
indeed one that exhibits moral revulsion. His view of the United 
States is positive from a Muslim perspective: he repeatedly refers 
to the United States as a land where Islam can be freely spread 
and practiced (“Others chose to migrate to other countries, such 
as the U.S., where they can spread the message of Islam freely 
and in the same time support their brothers and sisters who are 
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continuing their efforts to apply God’s rules in the Islamic coun-
tries,” p. 139); also: “Islam became the fastest growing religion in 
the U.S., as it is in the whole world, all praise be to God first, and 
to the tolerant, open society here” (p. 139); also: 
Now, even though the Islamic system and way of life is for 
the best of all humanity [sic], devout Muslims, as I believe, 
are not asking to apply it here in the U.S., where Muslims 
are less than 7 million. They are a minority. The fact is that 
they want to apply it in the Islamic countries where the ma-
jority are Muslims. But in those countries, today’s selfish, 
arrogant and self-deceited kings, presidents and rulers want 
to apply their own self-invented rules . . . [T]o make the long 
story short [sic], by the 20th century, the rulers started to 
neglect the Koranic laws, substituting them with manmade 
[sic] laws. The result is what we see today. Muslim nations 
are the weakest, poorest and most miserable. That is why, 
in my opinion, we find devout, committed Muslims, indi-
viduals and groups, working actively to reimplement God’s 
rules and guidance (pp. 137-138).  
As for moral revulsion: “[D]evout Muslims, . . even in time of 
conflict, they should not exceed certain limits, harming innocent 
people or noncombatant ones. This is very stressed upon [sic] in 
the Koran and the teachings of the prophet Muhammad, peace 
be upon him, who even prohibited destroying crops, animals or 
property at time of war” (p. 139); and again: 
When the bombings happened in Africa in ’98, my opinion 
was that that action was extreme and not in accordance with 
the beliefs that I learned. I made my opinion clear well be-
fore I was arrested or charged. Today, my opinion is still the 
same towards what happened in Africa and what happened 
here last month (September 11, 2001 [9/11]. The killing of 
innocent people and noncombatant is radical, extreme and 
cannot be tolerated by any religion, principles, beliefs or val-
ues. Today I can stand here and say that I did not participate 
or support any extreme conduct or any act that violates my 
beliefs as a devout Muslim...(pp. 141-142). 
El-Hage, at pp. 142-143, identifies “many American policies 
towards Muslim countries [that] are wrong” including the alleged 
“over one million child [sic] and thousands of innocent people” 
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affected by the embargo on Iraq; “the unconditional support of 
the American government to the Israeli government that is kill-
ing innocent Palestinians, taking their land, expelling them and 
destroying their homes” (p. 142); the effect on deeply religious 
Muslims of “having non-Muslim troops on the land of Muslims’ 
holiest sites, its negative impact on Muslim masses around the 
world and specifically those on the Arabian Peninsula” (p. 142). 
He goes on to also say though: 
Such policies, in my opinion, are wrong and end up breeding 
unjustified extremism. . . . Many Muslims and non-Muslims 
have expressed the same views. That includes the American 
Muslim community, which I am a member of, which is free 
to voice its criticism to the American policy [sic] but without 
committing or supporting any extreme acts (pp. 142-143). 
In his defense, he also states: “I am still the person who avoids 
radical solutions and acts, as I did in the past” (p. 145). (El-Hage 
had at that time no prior record of any violent or illegal activity.) 
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paganda, see Donald Holbrook, “Al-Qaeda Communiques by 
Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri: A Chronology,” Alex P. Schmid, The 
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2010, pp. 408-428.
176. See, for example, Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, 
“Framing Processes and Social Movements,” Annual Review of So-
ciology, Vol. 26, 2000, pp. 611-639.
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18, 2001, from the Chairman of the Committee of Experts on Af-
ghanistan appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1333 
(2000) addressed to the Secretary-General,” whose “Enclosure” is: 
“Report of the Committee of Experts appointed pursuant to Secu-
rity Resolution 1333 (2000), para. 15 (a), regarding monitoring of 
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went during the period 1994-2001 to negotiate secretly with high-
level Taliban for extradition of Osama bin Laden and elimination 
of terrorist sanctuaries, may be found at The National Security 
Archive, available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv. Here are two no-
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East African Embassies, on August 22, 1998, Mullah Omar called 
a State Department official. (See www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
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talization in original): 
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A STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL IN WASHINGTON 
THAT THE TALIBAN WAS OPEN TO THE SUGGES-
TION OF ESTABLISHING A VEHICLE FOR SECURE 
COMMUNICATION WITH USG OFFICIALS, POSSIBLY 
THROUGH AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD. WHILE OMAR 
PARROTED SOME OF BIN LADEN’S HARD-LINE VIEWS, 
HE LISTENED TO U.S. ARGUMENTS ON THE REASONS 
FOR U.S. ATTACKS IN AFGHANISTAN AND SUDAN 
AND THE REASONS WHY BIN LADEN’S CONTINUED 
ACTIVITIES WERE NOT IN THE INTEREST OF THE 
AFGHAN PEOPLE. OMAR WARNED THAT THE U.S. 
STRIKES WOULD PROVE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE AND 
AROUSE ANTI-AMERICAN FEELINGS IN THE ISLAMIC 
WORLD. WHILE HE WAS IN NO WAY THREATENING, 
HE CLAIMED THE STRIKES COULD SPARK MORE TER-
RORIST ATTACKS. HE ASKED FOR EVIDENCE OF BIN 
LADEN’S INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORIST ACTIONS. 
END SUMMARY. 
Though the above cable asserts that plenty of evidence ex-
ists of bin Laden’s terrorist activities, a follow-up cable on August 
23, 1998, see www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB134/Doc 
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evidence, as well as other talking points to be used in follow-up 
communication. The Subject of this embassy cable dated August 
23, 1998, “Message to the Taliban on Bin Laden,” is summarized 
in its first paragraph: 
FOLLOWING UP ON TELEPHONE CONVERSATION 
WITH TALIBAN LEADER MULLAH OMAR (REFTEL) 
WHICH INDICATED AN APPARENT OPENNESS FOR 
DIALOGUE, POST IS INSTRUCTED TO ENGAGE WITH 
AN AUTHORITATIVE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE TALI-
BAN TO EXPEL SAUDI TERRORIST OSAMA BIN LADEN 
SO THAT HE CAN BE PROPERLY BROUGHT TO JUSTICE 
FOR HIS TERRORIST ACTS. THE APPARENT READINESS 
OF THE TALIBAN FOR SERIOUS DIALOGUE NEEDS TO 
BE PROBED, WITH THE REALIZATION THAT IT COULD 
TURN OUT TO BE A PLOY FOR RECOGNITION OR OTH-
ER BENEFITS OR A DEVICE TO STALL FOR TIME.
 For the legality of the U.S. use of force after 9/11 in Opera-
tion ENDURING FREEDOM, see Authorization for Use of Military 
Force (AUMF), Public Law No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224, 2001; The UN 
Charter, which according to Schmitt (Michael N. Schmitt, Coun-
ter-Terrorism and the Use of Force in International Law, The Marshall 
Center Papers, No. 5. Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany: The 
George Marshall Center, 2002, pp. iv + 98), “The Charter in limit-
ing state behavior—Article 2(4)—also empowers states to defend 
themselves, and this defense is not restricted to defense against 
state actors (see esp. Article 39, and Article 51).” Was it legal? 
Schmitt states: “No voices were raised [in the UN Council] claim-
ing that either the customary right of self-defense or Article 51 
was limited to the context of State actions” (p. 27). Also consider: 
NATO’s invocation of Article V requiring collective self-defense, 
the actions of most states, and the fact that “in no case, was there 
any suggestion that the right was dependent on identifying a 
State as the attacker” (Ibid.), and that post-October 7 United Na-
tions Security Council (UNSC) resolutions “went so far as to urge 
member States to ‘root out terrorism, in keeping with the Charter 
of the United Nations’” (p.27; see S.C. Res. 1378 (Nov. 14, 2002); 
S.C. Res. 1386 (Dec. 20, 2001; S.C. Res. 1390 (January 16, 2002); See 
also S.C. Res. 1368 (September 12, 2001), S.C. Res. 1373 (Septem-
ber 28, 2001), and S.C. Res. 1377 (November 12, 2001).
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178. Above excerpts are translated from their Arabic book, 
Islam and the Laws of War, which appeared in serial form in the 
newspaper, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London, UK), August-September 
2006; Translated and exerpted in MEMRI, “Al-Gama’a Al-Is-
lamiyya vs. Al-Qaeda,” available from www.memri.org/report/en/
print1887.htm. 
179. This paraphrase of Isam al-Din Dirbalah, Istratijiyat wa 
Tafjirat al-Qa’ida: al-Akhta wa al-Akhtar (The al-Qa’ida Organization’s 
Strategy and Bombings: Mistakes and Rulings), Cairo, Egypt: Makta-
bat al-Turath al-Islami, 2003, appears in Abd-al-Latif al-Minawi, 
“Part 1 of Book Review: Egyptian Islamist Leaders Fault Al-Qai-
da’s Strategy,” available from www.opensource.gov; Original Ara-
bic publication in Al-Sharq al-Awsat, Internet Version, January, 
11, 2004. 
180. See Ibid., for a more expansive discussion of these three 
phases, presenting very illuminating insights into the Islamic 
Group’s nuanced and objective analysis of U.S. vital interests and 
policies. With respect to U.S. policies toward Israel and Arab and 
Muslim issues, it states: 
We should not disregard the role of the fundamentalist 
Christian right in the United States that began to grow and 
influence the internal and external trends of the Administra-
tion. An alliance emerged between the Jewish lobby and the 
fundamentalist Christian right. The influence of this alliance 
focused on the Arab-Israeli conflict and found a pretext to 
meddle in the internal affairs of various countries, espe-
cially Muslim countries, under the slogan of ‘backing the 
persecuted minorities in the world’. 
The importance of the Islamic Group’s rejection of conspiracy 
theories for explaining the present predicament confronting the 
Arab and Muslim world is also telling. They state
 The conspiracy theory truly means leaving one’s [free] will 
so that only the will of the CIA and the Mossad prevail. Then 
we blame our mistakes and apathy on the United States, the 
Israeli conspiracy, and other states, as if we had no role in 
everything that happened in this world.
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(See Najih Ibrahim, Egyptian Group shura council member’s 
submitted conference paper, translated and reported in “Egypt: 
Statement by Leading Islamic Group Figure Says No-Violence 
Initiative Strong,” available from www.opensource.gov, original in 
Arabic, Al-Misri Al-Yawm, Cairo, July 2, 2007.)
181. Jihad—striving/struggling in the path of Allah to raise 
Allah’s Word supreme—is classically understood to take five 
forms: jihad of the heart/soul, designed to cleanse one of impure 
intentions and thoughts (jihad bil nafs/qalb), jihad of the tongue 
(jihad bil lisan), jihad of the pen/knowledge (jihad bil qalam/ilm), 
jihad of the hand, i.e., commanding the good and forbidding the 
bad through bodily reward and punishment (jihad bil yad), and 
the most potentially life-threatening and therefore most regulated 
of all, the jihad of the sword (jihad bis saif).
 
182. The words we use to describe AQ’s actions are key to 
their legal and moral status in Islam. For an important contribu-
tion to leveraging Islamic law and morality to further marginalize 
and criminalize AQ, see “Words that Work and Words that Don’t: 
A Guide for Counterterrorism Communication,” Vol. 2, No. 10, 
McLean, VA: National Counter Terrorism Center, Counterter-
rorism Communications Center, March 14, 2008, p. 14, available 
from www.investigativeproject.org/documents/misc/127.pdf; Office 
for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, Terminology to Define the Ter-
rorists: Recommendations from American Muslims, Washington, DC: 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, January 2008, available 
from www.dhs.gov/terminology-define-terrorists-recommendations-
american-muslims. The words we use to describe our “war” against 
the AQ terrorist entity are also telling. For a remarkably wise and 
prescient, early post-9/11 reflection by a noted military histo-
rian and theorist, see Michael Howard, Comment: “What’s in a 
Name?: How to Fight Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs, January/Feb-
ruary 2002 (based on a London lecture given October 30, 2001), 
available from www.foreignaffairs.com/print/57615.
183. See Kamolnick, Delegitimizing Al-Qaeda; Paul Kamolnick, 
“Al Qaeda’s Sharia Crisis: Sayyid Imam and the Jurisprudence 
of Lawful Military Jihad” (for former Al Qaeda shari’a guide, 
Sayyid Imam’s comprehensive fiqh-based critique of AQ’s doc-
trine of ‘killing in masse’); and Kamolnick, “The Egyptian Islamic 
Group’s Critique of Al Qaeda’s Interpretation of Jihad.” 
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184. Ibid.
185. For an examination of several key moral objections to ter-
rorism, particularly its parasitic nature as a form of moral free-
riding, see Paul Kamolnick, “Defending Liberal Democracy in an 
Age of Terror,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 2012, Vol. 24, esp. 
pp. 148-157.
186. Amaney A. Jamal, “It’s Not Who We Are, It’s What We 
Do,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 92, No. 5, September/October 2013, 
pp. 152-154.
187. Ibid. p. 154.
188. See especially Harry R. Yarger, Strategic Theory for the 
21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy, Carlisle, PA: Strate-
gic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 2006, 
available from www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil; H. Richard 
Yarger, “Toward a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the U.S. 
Army War College Strategy Model,” J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., 
ed., U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Vol. 
I: Theory of War and Strategy, 5th Ed., Carlisle, PA: Strategic Stud-
ies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 2012, pp. 45-51; Ap-
pendix I, “Guidelines for Strategy Formulation,” pp. 413-418, J. 
Boone Bartholomees, Jr., ed., U.S. Army War College Guide to Na-
tional Security Issues, Vol. II: National Security Policy and Strategy, 
5th Ed., Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 
College, June 2012; Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., “Chap. 13: Toward an 
Understanding of Military Strategy,” J. R. Cerami and J. F. Hol-
comb, Jr., eds., U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy, Carlisle, 
PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,  February 
2001. pp. 179-185.
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